Moreover, there is no validity to the argument that a general crisis in the German banking sector would have been triggered and would have had a drastic impact on KfW. All other banks would have been similarly affected by a crisis. But the share of the banking associations in the risk shield, capped at EUR 1 billion (approximately 30 %), bears no relation to the market share of their member banks in Germany, which is over 95 % [The Commission further notes that the other owners of IKB did not participate in the support measure.]. The Commission therefore sees no commercial reason for the disproportionate involvement of KfW. Thus while KfW might indeed have intervened to some extent in the interest of its subsidiaries, it clearly acted in a way that went beyond what a private investor would have done. A private owner would have limited his involvement much more and relied on additional support from the banking associations or the State. Thus KfW, at least to some extent, did not act like a market investor.
74 5. ASSESSMENT › 5.1. Existence of aid › (a) The risk shield and capital contribution measures (first three measures), Decision_act (EU) 2009/775
In forcesince 21 Oct 2008