This applies in the first place to the sale of SIP 1 to KfW, at a price [< 10] % below the IFRS book value. It is true that this price is better than the price that Lone Star negotiated for SIP 2 ([discount > 10,0] %) but it must be borne in mind that SIP 2 contained mainly […] and SIP 1 did not. Germany therefore claims that KfW will be able to sell the portfolio or hold it until maturity without losses. Moreover, KfW needed support from its owner, the State, for the purchase of SIP 1 because it […]; the purchase was facilitated by the guarantee in order to avoid KfW having to commit equity of about EUR […] million ([…]). Second, KfW’s involvement in SIP 2 was also market-based since it involved only low risk, owing to the seniority of the loan, while the remuneration was high, at Euribor plus [> 80] bps, for which Germany provided market benchmarks. Finally, the fact that KfW had to provide an indemnity of EUR […] billion for […] is typical in cases where the risk of liability is low but the sum involved is large, and this condition was sought by all interested parties in the last round.
61 4. COMMENTS FROM GERMANY FOLLOWING THE OPENING DECISION, Decision_act (EU) 2009/775
In forcesince 21 Oct 2008