It is not true that the intervention would be less costly for KfW and Germany than liquidation [This test is in line with the Commission’s constant practice. See Joined Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke [1999] ECR II-17, paragraph 124. However, winding-up costs are normally difficult to calculate and estimates are faced with uncertainties, see for example Commission Decision 2005/345/EC in Case C 28/02 Bankgesellschaft Berlin, recitals 163 et seq. Also Commission Decision 2008/263/EC in Case C 50/06 BAWAG, recital 166.], even when evaluated ex ante at the time when the investment decision was made [Joined Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke [1999] ECR II-17, paragraph 121.]. First, the Commission cannot accept all the liquidation costs put forward by Germany. Although the Commission recognises that the book value of IKB was indeed EUR 620 million, in the opening decision it pointed out that IKB’s share price dropped significantly before KfW’s intervention, so that KfW’s holding in IKB at the time of the intervention was probably not equal to this book value. Furthermore, in the opening decision the Commission questioned whether the underlying default risk of around [> 15] % from the loans distributed in the development business was realistic. Germany has not provided sufficient evidence to support the plausibility of KfW’s estimate.
69 5. ASSESSMENT › 5.1. Existence of aid › (a) The risk shield and capital contribution measures (first three measures), Decision_act (EU) 2009/775
In forcesince 21 Oct 2008
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, extended composition) of 21 January 1999. Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH and Lech-StaDecision
21 Jan 1999 · 61995TJ0129
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