Thirdly, although the Parties' relatively high market shares can be counterbalanced to some extent by the increased influence of customers in the tram market, the Commission's market investigation has shown that buyer power is not sufficient to outweigh the effects of the notified concentration. On the one hand, customers' bargaining power has increased in so far as purchasing pools and buying consortia have become more common in recent years. For instance, two German municipal train operators, Leipziger Verkehrsbetriebe GmbH and Rostocker Straßenbahn AG, recently issued a joint call for tenders in the tram market(34), as did Mannheimer Versorgungs- und Verkehrsgesellschaft AG (MVV-Verkehr AG), in cooperation with Heidelberger Straßen- und Bergbahn AG, Oberrheinische Eisenbahn AG, Rhein-Haardtbahn GmbH and Verkehrsbetriebe Ludwigshafen GmbH(35). The market investigation has shown that more such consortia and cooperation can be expected in the future. On the other hand, it is true that a vast majority of customers are mainly local train operating companies or municipalities. Therefore, unlike in the market for high-speed or intercity trains, the demand side in the tram and LRV sector remains much more fragmented and does not enjoy a sufficient degree of countervailing buyer power to rule out the danger of market dominance by the Parties.
Recital 81, Decision_act (EU) 2002/191
In forcesince 3 Apr 2001