[ . . . ].
Even if the interpretation of Article 3 (4) now put forward by the parties was correct [ . . . ], the Commission's view is that there is still joint control of HMG. The fact that there is a casting vote for a parent company in case that reconciliation is not possible despite the best efforts of all parent companies, does not necessarily mean that there is no joint control (see notice on the notion of a concentration OJ No C 385 of 31 December 1994, p. 5 (paragraph 37)). This is, in particular, the case where each parent company provides a contribution to a joint venture which is vital for its operation (paragraph 34). In the present case, the basic purpose of the joint venture is to combine the two RTL channels with the new commercial Veronica channel and to ensure the supply of programmes from Endemol which is, according to the parties, vital for maintaining the profile of the HMG channels. Both the RTL side and the Veronica-Endemol side thus provide a contribution which is crucial to the operation of HMG. In these circumstances, the parent companies of HMG are only able to operate the joint venture with each other's agreement on the most important strategic decisions. The use of the contested casting vote by RTL, therefore, would in practice be limited to unusual situations and does not prevent the joint venture from being jointly controlled.