Recital 112, Decision_act (EU) 1994/601

In forcesince 13 Jul 1994

Independently, however, of Stora's statements, the documentary evidence obtained by the Commission during the investigation is overwhelming. It is well recognized in the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance that participants in cartels liable to substantial penalties under Community competition rules will not record their unlawful agreements in formal contracts but will rely on oral assurances given in the course of secret industry meetings. Documentary records of their contact may be destroyed. In order to prove the existence and the terms of any agreement, the Commission will have to rely to a greater or lesser extent on indirect evidence. In the present case there is in fact a considerable amount of direct as well as indirect proof of express agreement between the producers. In particular, the Commission relies on the following:

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the setting up of an institutionalized system of regular meetings in the PG Paperboard which provided the structure for continuing collusion,

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the complete absence of any official minutes, invitations or other contemporary record of the deliberations of the PWG and JMC,

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the M-M document setting out full details of the 1987 agreement on market shares and price discipline (recitals 53, 54 and 55),

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the documentation found at Cascades showing the fixing of 'floor prices' for 1988 (recital 77),

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the very detailed notes of four of the JMC meetings (made in apparent disregard of the standing rule) obtained from FS-Karton and Rena (recitals 80, 82 and 84-87),

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the private note made by M-M/FS-Karton of the Economic Committee meeting of 3 October 1989 (recital 50),

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the three price lists obtained from Finnboard and Rena (recitals 79, 80 and 83),

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the notes from several different sources of the meetings showing implementation of the cartel on a national level (recitals 91-97) as well as the note of the Arlanda meeting (recital 58),

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the pattern of virtually exact correspondence in timing and amount of the price increases which each producer implemented on the various national markets.

(The above is not an exhaustive list.)