In its judgment of 16 December 1975 in relation to the European Sugar Cartel (Suiker Unie and other v. Commission, Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 55, 111, 113 and 114/73, [1975] ECR, p. 1663) the Court of Justice held that the criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case law of the Court must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that each economic operator must determine independently the commercial policy which he intends to adopt in the common market. This requirement of independence does not deprive undertakings of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors but it does strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between them, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitior or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.
Thus conduct may fall within Article 65 (1) as a 'concerted practice' even where the parties have not reached agreement in advance on a common plan defining their action in the market but adopt or adhere to collusive devices which facilitate the coordination of their commercial behaviour.
The above definition of the Court of Justice is particularly apt to apply to the price increases implemented in the United Kingdom in 1990 (see recitals 111, 112 and 115), and the harmonization of size extras at the end of 1990 (see recitals 139 to 142). It has also to be taken into account that, in a complex cartel, some participants at one time or another might not express their definite assent to a particular course of action agreed by the others but nevertheless indicate their general support for the scheme in question and conduct themselves accordingly.
The importance of the concept of a concerted practice does not thus result so much from the distinction between it and an 'agreement' as from the distinction between forms of collusion falling under Article 65 (1) and mere parallel behaviour with no element of concertation.
This interpretation was endorsed by the Court of First Instance in its recent judgments in the polypropylene cases (see for example its judgment of 24 October 1991, Rhône-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991] ECR II, p. 867, paragraph 124).
Nothing therefore turns in the present case upon the precise form taken by the collusive arrangements.
3.3. The object and effect of the cartel