The agreement was effectively applied by the parties for a period of just over three years. The Commission considers that an agreement concluded between, and subsequently implemented by, the three major producers in a market in recession, and based on an exchange of confidential information on the one hand about traditional market positions and on the other hand providing a means of monitoring their future performance, has inherent restrictive effects upon competition although these may not be measurable or even apparent to an observer of the market unaware of the existence of such an agreement.
By effectively applying the agreement, the parties have shown their genuine commitment to the market stabilization objective underlying it. Through the exchange of information they artifically increased transparency between them by obtaining knowledge of each other's activities which they would not have had in the absence of the agreement. The Commission considers that this will inevitably have led them to temper their competitive behaviour towards each other. In that respect, it is immaterial that the development of the parties' respective market shares may show that there was scope for competition between them and that they may well have taken business from each other. This illustrates at best that the parties' commitment to market stabilization did not amount to an outright quota-fixing arrangement.