11 III. ASSESSMENT, Decision_act (EU) 2008/741

In force

Furthermore, even though they represent a small part of the total amount of electricity produced and/or consumed in a Member State, the functioning of the balancing markets should also be considered as an additional indicator. In fact, ‘any market participant who cannot easily match its generation portfolio to the characteristics of its customers may find itself exposed to the difference between the price at which the transmission system operator [hereinafter TSO] will sell imbalance energy, and the price at which it will buy back excess production. These prices may either be directly imposed by the regulator on the TSO; or alternatively a market based mechanism will be used in which the price is determined by bids from other producers to regulate their production upwards or downwards […]. A key difficulty for small market participants arises where there is the risk of a large spread between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price. This occurs in a number of Member States and is likely to be detrimental to the development of competition. A high spread may be indicative of an insufficient level of competition in the balancing market which may be dominated by only one or two main generators’ [Commission Staff Working Document, Technical Annex to the 2005 Report, SEC(2005)1448, hereinafter referred to as ‘Technical Annex’, p. 67–68.]. Despite having a relatively low spread [According to the Final Report, paragraph 993, table 52, the Polish balancing market operates with a spread of 13, which places it in the lower half as spread in balancing markets in the EU ranges between 0 and 79. This analysis looks at the effects on electricity generation of the workings of the balancing market and not at the degree of competition within the balancing market itself. For this purpose it is therefore unimportant whether a low spread is caused by competition or a price cap imposed by the regulator, just as the elevated concentration on the balancing market is without pertinence in this analysis.] between the buying price from the TSO and the selling price, the Polish balancing market and its main characteristics – in particular the lack of an intra-day market or access to other market platforms that may function as a substitute as well as certain aspects of balancing costs – are such that the ‘current structure of tariffs for transmission services, under which all customers are charged with the balancing and congestion management costs, does not send appropriate economical signals for the market participants’ [See Roadmap, p. 11.]. The functioning of the Polish balancing market can therefore not be taken as an additional indicator that electricity production and wholesale are directly exposed to competition.