In short, therefore, given current market conditions and subject to the examination of the effects of a possible financial strengthening of RAG (see section 2, recital 47 et seq.), it cannot be assumed that RAG within the meaning of the first indent of Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty might determine prices, control or restrict production or distribution, or hinder effective competition in a substantial part of the markets affected by the merger. Under these conditions, which have changed since 1998, there is likewise no risk that RAG within the meaning of the second indent of Article 66(2) might evade the rules of competition instituted under the ECSC Treaty, in particular by establishing an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage in access to supplies or markets. This applies both to an independent German coal market and to a market that is more extensively defined in geographical terms. If an international coal market is assumed, the parties' market shares would clearly be smaller, since their activities are focused on Germany and other competitors would have to be taken into consideration. On such a wider market, even less competitive importance would ultimately attach to RAG's special position in relation to German coal.
Recital 46, Decision_act (EU) 2003/36
In forcesince 7 May 2002