, Decision_act (EU) 1992/194

In forcesince 4 Mar 1992
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In November 1991 the operator carried out one of the two physical inventory takings which are required under code 5 of the Commisison Decision of 4 February 1981 laying down particular safeguard provisions. On 30 November 1991 UKAEA Dounreay completed the physical inventory taking at the uranium fuel fabrication installation. Its results reveaaled an unacceptably high difference between the physical and the book stocks of uranium (Material Unaccounted For: 'MUF`) which was attributed predominantly to the uranium scrap/residue recovery plant.

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On 4 December 1991 UKAEA Dounreay decided to withdraw the Authority To Operate (ATO) for the plant and to set up an Internal Inquiry Team to Investigage the circumstance leading to the unacceptably high MUF and to make appropriate recommendations.

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Immediate anomaly investigation procedures were carried out by Euratom safeguard inespectors in December 1991 and January 1992 and a reinventory after a complete wash out was considered necessary. These investigations up to the re-inventory established or reconfirmed:

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an insufficient oeprating records system,

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an overstatement of shipper's data (considered only likely for a small proportion of the material treated),

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undeclared transfers between the uranium scrap/residue recovery plant and the waste plant,

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uncertainties in the weights of slags, swabs and sweepings (these weights seemed to be underestimated),

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unmeasured quantities of uranium in the solvent,

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unmeasured inventories in tanks and in the dissolvers,

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inconsistent measurements on slags from some campaigns,

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a number of unrecorded transfers having taken place during the material balance period,

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material omitted from the inventory in November 1991.

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On 22 January 1992 the UK Department of Energy transmitted to the Commission the report of the UKAEA Inquiry Team which concluded that the originally assessed MUF had to be reduced considerably.

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On 3 February 1992 the re-inventory was completed and also showed a considerable reduction of the originally assessed MUF.

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After the hearing of 10 February 1992 the Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate confirmed its previous findings set out above and concluded that altough the remaining MUF's were not significantly different from the zero-hypothesis, the associated uncertainties and the original high MUF indicate significant deficiencies in the operator's materials accounting system for transfers, inventory procedures and system of measurement.