Considering that the Parties’ combined market shares in the upstream market for
wet-leasing services would be moderate (not exceeding [30-40]% under any plausible market delineation) and that numerous airlines provide wet-leasing services in the EEA, the merged entity could not have the ability to restrict access to wetleasing services (input foreclosure) to airlines providing franchise services in the EEA. Considering that the Parties’ market share in the downstream market for franchise services would be moderate (below 30% under any plausible market delineation) and that Air Nostrum only purchases wet-leasing services to cover ad hoc specific capacity needs that may arise in the context of the Iberia franchise agreement, the merged entity would not represent a significant customer base for wet-leasing services post-Transaction.75 As a result, there is no risk that the merged entity will restrict access of wet-lessors to the downstream markets for franchise services post-Transaction (customer foreclosure).