Recital 73, Decision_act (EU) 2019/9062

In forcesince 23 Jul 2019

Considering that Falko’s market share in the upstream market for dry-leasing

services of regional aircraft would be low (below [5-10]%), the Commission considers that the merged entity could not have the ability to restrict access to regional aircraft (input foreclosure) to airlines providing wet-leasing services in the EEA. Considering that the Parties’ market share in the downstream market for wetleasing services of regional aircraft would be moderate (not exceeding [30-40]%

64 For the sake of completeness, the Parties indicated that Air Investment Valencia subsidiary Saimer provides dry leasing services to other Air Investment Valencia subsidiaries (Form CO, paragraph 222).

65 Form CO, paragraph 109 et seq. and reply to RFI 1 of 10 July 2019, question 2 and reply to RFI 2 of 11 July 2019, question 1.

66 Form CO, paragraph 105 and reply to RFI 2 of 11 July 2019, question 2.

67 Form CO, paragraph 109.

68 Replies to QP 1 of 8 February 2019, question 8 and RFI 2 of 11 July 2019, question 1. The Parties indicated that Falko’s share in dry-leasing aircraft with a size between 70 and 90+ seats would be below [5-10]% in a geographic market defined as EEA-wide. The Parties submitted that Falko’s share in the worldwide market is necessarily lower.

69 Form CO, paragraph 109 and reply to RFI 2 of 11 July 2019, question 1. under any plausible market delineation) and that numerous airlines provide wetleasing services in the EEA, the merged entity would not represent a significant customer base for dry-leasing services of regional aircraft post-Transaction.

Furthermore, Air Nostrum dry-leases [number of aircraft] from a third party dry lessor. Air Nostrum’s demand thus represents [less than 10]% of the EEA or worldwide market for dry-leased aircraft.70 As a result, there is no risk that the merged entity will restrict access of dry-lessors to the downstream markets for wetleasing services post-Transaction (customer foreclosure).