, Special Report No 3/98 concerning the implementation by the Commission of EU policy and…

In forcesince 19 Mar 1998
132.

An effective combination of the financing and incentive functions can be achieved if the charge tariff is determined by the financial requirements of water quality management. It means that the costs of operating the system and all the ancillary services, including the amortisation of capital costs, should be billed to the user in accordance with the polluter-pays principle. Under this approach the expected reduction in capacity generated by the incentive effects, as well as the size of the agglomeration served, must be taken into account in planning the capacity of a treatment plant, otherwise overcapacity may be the result.

133.

It is a matter of concern, for example, that these projects, and the arrangements apparently made for their financing, did not take into account seasonal variations in the throughput of the facilities, with the result that facilities in more popular tourist areas were unable to meet the demands during the height of the tourist season.

134.

It is not clear that rational charging policies in accordance with the polluter pays principle have been sufficiently reconciled with the impact of EU subsidies. The capital costs of improvements in waste water treatment facilities and the corresponding maintenance costs are such that Member States naturally wish to minimise these costs, or at any rate to obtain as much assistance towards them as possible, in order to reduce both their impact on public sector budgets and the impact of high water charges on their electorates. In the case of most of the projects audited by the Court, public authorities and operators were already experiencing significant difficulties, especially in:

–

advancing capital (the region's share in financing the capital investment), and

–

fixing 'politically` and 'socially` acceptable charging rates for their 'customers`.

Moreover where facilities are co-financed by the Structural Funds (and notably by the Cohesion Fund, where associated revenue has explicitly to be taken into account in determining the amount of EU assistance [see Article 7, paragraph 2 of the CF Regulation]), the political and economic incentives are such that the costs of countering pollution are all too readily transferred from the polluter to the European taxpayer.

CONCLUSION