above, as regards goods traded between France and Gabon and transported by sea, irrespective of the port of loading or of discharge, no shipping line of one country shall enjoy in the other country less favourable treatment than a national shipping line if a cargo-sharing rule is applied'.
C. Conduct of the companies
The shipowners' agreements
General agreements
The 11 texts establishing the shipowners' committees vary in form and title according to the bilateral relationship in question(7) .
The basic documents are usually supplemented by 'implementing texts' such as notices to shipowners and shippers issued by the Committee's Secretariat (Secrétama), or by 'practical implementing arrangements'.
The signatories to the bilateral agreements are the French lines and the national line flying the flag of the African State concerned. In some cases (Guinea, Cameroon, Mali, Gabon), the agreements are also countersigned by the bodies which, against remuneration, are responsible for monitoring their implementation, i.e. Secrétama in France and the shippers' council at the African end(8) .
Aim of the shipowners' agreements
The main aims may be summarized as follows:
to ensure a 'balanced distribution of trade' between the French and African carriers concerned 'without neglecting the share normally due to the third party carrier'. The distribution usually follows the 40:40:20 rule of the Unctad code of conduct (see recital 10) but, in the case of shipowners' committees, covers all the trades,
to apply the cargo-sharing rule to all commodities of French origin (southbound) or originating in the African State in question (northbound) carried by liner vessels. It is specified(9) that, 'initially', the ratio is limited to goods loaded or discharged in French ports and that the agreement does not cover goods in transit through French territory or the African State concerned.
Operating rules
The shipowners' agreements provide for the following general operating rules, with some differences according to the bilateral trade concerned: monthly meeting on a specific date of a committee(10) which, taking account of:
the performance of each shipping company in the preceding reference period,
the quotas allocated to each shipping company, and
trade flow predictions,
fixes, for each company, a 'loading authorization'. The total loading authorizations (in freight tonnes) issued to shipping companies of third countries may not exceed 20 % of the entire trade in question(11) .
The shipowners' agreements provide for the introduction of a mechanism to ensure that committee members do not exceed the quotas allocated to them.
To that end, Secrétama, for south-bound traffic, and the Shippers Council of the African State concerned(12) for north-bound traffic, are required to stamp, for each cargo, the manifests which must compulsorily be submitted by shipowners.
Shipowners are also required to provide the data used by Secrétama to produce statistics on the activities of the shipowners' committees.
Secrétama and the African Shippers Councils are empowered to carry out physical inspections of cargo.
These monitoring bodies act on behalf of the shipowners' committees and are remunerated by the members of these committees.
It should also be noted that one of the shipowners' agreements (France-Central African Republic) requires the monitoring bodies (Secrétama and the Central African Shippers Council) to 'report to the Central African national shipping company and the French shipping company, at least once a month, on the proper application of the agreement and, in particular, on the cargoes carried by the two national carriers and the third-country carrier'.
If quotas are exceed, either an adjustment may be made the following month or, in the case of repeated infringement, the African authorities may impose a fine.
In several cases (the France-Mali, France-Guinea, France-Niger, France-Burkina Faso, France-Congo committees), the shipowners' agreement provides in this connection that 'any failure to apply the practical arrangements for the implementation of the organization of trade will be notified to the parties concerned for their information'. The agreement between France and the Central African Republic is more explicit: 'any infringement of the provisions of the agreement (loading without authorization, exceeding of quota, unstamped manifests, etc.) shall be immediately notified by Secrétama to the Central African Shippers Council with a view to the application to the offenders of the measures provided for in such cases by the Central African regulations'. Similarly, the France-Mali agreement provides that 'the National Transport Office and the Mali structures in the ports of transit will, in conjunction with the competent authorities of the country of transit, impose the penalties provided for by Mali regulations in both the north-bound and the south-bound trades'.
Implementation of shipowners' agreements
Extension of cargo-sharing to the entire trade
The shipowners' committees, as provided for in the agreements which set them up, share out among their members all the 11 liner trades for which they are responsible; this rules out any competition by independent shipowners not approved by the committees against the members of the committees. The Commission is, moreover, unaware of any shipping company that has been able to operate liner services on a lasting and significant basis on the routes controlled by the shipowners' committees without their approval.
This situation is confirmed in the following documents:
memo dated April 1989 from a director of Delmas, a former chairman of shipowners' committees and co-director of Secrétama; the memo, which recommends extending the Franco-African committee system to other Euro-African trades, summarizes the committees' position on the scope of cargo-sharing: 'It seems essential to be adamant as regards the first point since it would be both ineffective and illogical to share only a part of the liner trade whilst leaving outsiders free to act as they will. It would also be the end of the conference system . . .';
memo dated 2 March 1988 in which the same person, still advocating the extension of the committee system to other Euro-African trades, confirms that the aim of such committees is to share cargo among members of the conferences and approved independent shipowners: 'The concept consists of a neutral "roof" or "umbrella" (e.g. Secrétama) which would cover both Cowac and outsider lines. It is best not to insist on the fact that this system already exists in other trades (it has been the subject of Danish complaints to the European Commission)';
record dated 1 March 1988 of a meeting (also concerning the extension to other trades of the committee system): 'The relevant conference lines agree in principle on a sharing of the national share between themselves and the independent lines of the same flag. Of course this could not be written in the minutes and neither was it noted the way the sharing of the totality of the trade is envisaged. The idea is to get together, under a single roof or umbrella, the Conference and the independent lines. This roof can be called a neutral body (of the Secrétama type)';
telex of 16 June 1988 in which the German company Woermann informed Cowac of the setting-up between the Federal Republic and Nigeria of a similar system to that of the shipowners' committees, described as follows: 'Such scheme will cover all German cargo shipped and received via whatever port of loading/discharge and administered by a neutral body very soon now being established in Germany. Through that scheme the necessary programming arrangements will be made along the experience gained in other continental countries already (Secrétama shipowners' committees) where no major problems exist;'
minutes of the meeting on 2 June 1986 of the France-Senegal shipowners' committee at which the Chairman of the committee 'reported that cargoes loaded on non-conference vessels to/from Dakar were not being controlled by the Committee'. The wording of this statement is apparently intended to draw the attention of those present at the meeting to a situation regarded as incidental and abnormal. If the committee members were being subjected to habitual and regular competition from outsiders, it would be generally known and the Chairman would not have to 'report' such an obvious fact;
introduction on the forms sent by Secrétama on 8 April 1981 to shipping lines wishing to operate between France and Senegal: 'We have noted your intention of taking part in the trade between France and Senegal . . . We would inform you that such participation, in order to secure the authorization of the Shipowners' Committee, requires your approval of a certain number of principles. . .'. The logical link thus established between a company's intention to take part in a bilateral trade and the authorization of the shipowners' committee concerned makes it clear that no company may operate in that trade without such authorization;
'notice to shipping companies' issued by Secrétama on 8 April 1981: 'We wish to remind the shipping companies operating in the trade between France and Senegal that, in order to be approved in that trade, they must contact the secretariat appointed by the Shipowners' Committee as the Secretariat in Paris. It must also be compulsory since 1 April 1981 in the trade in question for manifests to be stamped by Secrétama's inspectors';
letter dated 7 March 1986 to Maersk Line in which Secrétama drew the Danish company's attention 'to the fact that at present, the share of Franco-Senegalese trade allocated to vessels other than French and Senegalese vessels under the relevant bilateral agreement, has already been taken up by a very large number of shipping companies. Taken in conjunction with French-Senegalese companies, this trade is already more than adequately covered and reduces the monthly cargoes to be loaded by each line to ridiculously small proportions. We are sure that a traditional liner company such as yours will easily understand the pointlessness of adding additional capacity to this trade and that you will therefore not maintain your request to participate'. It is thus quite clear that the possibility of adding any new capacity could be considered only, according to Secrétama, if Maersk were to join the Shipowners' Committee and that, conversely, Maersk's exclusion from that committee was equivalent to exclusion from the trade.
Effects of extending cargo-sharing to the entire trade
Cargo-sharing, carried out according to the methods described in recital 18, takes place on a company by company basis. Thus, whilst French vessels in principle have a right overall to 40 % of the bilateral trade, their share of this 40 % is predetermined. Similarly, the 20 % allocated to third-country companies is distributed company by company. The main effect of the implementation of the shipowners' agreements is to freeze the market shares within the quota allocated to French and third-country companies, i.e. 60 % of the liner trade concerned.
The second effect of the cargo-sharing, even though it is presented as the sole justification for the existence of the shipowners' committees, is that the remaining 40 % of cargoes is reserved for the shipping company of the African country concerned. But only the Cameroon and Gabon shipping lines, with two vessels each, are in a position to use part of this quota. The other lines transfer their rights corresponding to the 40 % quota (as do the Cameroon and Gabon lines for those cargoes they are unable to carry themselves).
The African shipowners are all members of Cowac or Mewac, or of both conferences, whose internal rules stipulate that member companies may exchange or charter space only to other conference members. As a result, African trading rights are necessarily transferred to conference shipowners that are members of the shipowners' committees(13) . Another consequence of this provision is that the shipowners who, under the cargo-sharing rules applied by the shipowners' committees, receive the largest cargo-shares, are in the best position to make use of the so-called African trading rights: being guaranteed a minimum volume of cargo under their own trading rights, they are able carry any additional cargo at a lower marginal cost than their competitors who are allocated much smaller cargoes. This is to the advantage of the French national lines of which there are only four or five (grouped into two entities) who share the 40 % allocated to French vessels(14) , whilst the 20 % allocated to third-country vessels is shared by up to 20 companies in certain cases (Annex I).
Whilst the machinery set up by the shipowners' agreements has not fostered the development of African fleets, it has on the other hand strengthened the trading position of the French companies on the trades in question. In return, the African party has an interest in the financial results of the companies effectively operating in these trades:
the fee paid by the shipowners to the body responsible at the African end for controlling cargo-sharing (see paragraph 19),
the commission paid to the African shipping companies for transferring their trading rights to companies having the vessels to make use of such rights.
Closing of trade
The only way the shipowners' committees can effectively control their trade is by imposing penalties on members exceeding their quotas and on independent lines operating without the approval of the committees. This is the reason why the members of the committees ensured that the African authorities adopted rules protecting their activities and providing for penalties, where such rules were not already in force. This is confirmed by the Chairman of the French-Senegal Committee as early as 1981 (memo of 19 May 1981): '. . . all the arrangements are ready at the shipowners' end. . . Obviously it all depends on the introduction in the meantime of an effective system for imposing administrative penalties on shipowners infringing the cargo-sharing rules'. This approach is confirmed in a subsequent note in which the same writer, advocating the extension to other Euro-African trades of the shipowner committee system, states that (memo of April 1989) 'all this. . . presupposes checks on arrival (in African ports) of duly stamped manifests and the application of penalties for failure to comply with the shipping rules thus set up'. The following documents relate to the efforts made by members of the shipowners' committees to secure the adoption by the African authorities of measures penalizing shipping companies failing to comply with the committees' rules:
telex of 30 June 1981 to the Senegalese authorities: 'The French national shipowners of the shipowners' committee. . . are very pleased to learn of the imminent signing of the decree concerning the penalties to be applied to shipowners infringing the shipping rules adopted by the Shipowners' Committee. Once the decree has been adopted, the French shipowners will be prepared to increase the reallocation fee to 10 % (this is a commission paid by the French shipping companies to the Senegalese shipping companies for the use of their trading rights);
minutes of the meeting on 30 June 1987 of the France-Burkina Shipowners' Committee at which the representative of the Burkinabé Shippers Council (BSC) expressed concern at the fact that the 40:40:20 cargo-sharing rule was in practice being applied to the detriment of the Burkinabé party and asked that the method of application be changed; the exchange of views was minuted as follows: 'The French company agreed without prejudice that the trade should be entirely closed. The BSC considered that the closing of the trade should not be regarded as conditional';
minutes of the meeting of 28 July 1988 of the France-Mali Shipowners Committee:
'During the discussion, the French company stressed that it was essential that the agreement(15) be implemented properly and referred to the measures that would have to be taken in Mali in order to achieve effective control of the system. It would in particular be necessary rapidly to secure the legislation enabling infringements (shippers and shipowners) to be penalized';
working paper dated June 1987 from the Director of Foreign Relations of the French company Delmas to the Chairman of the Mali Shipping Company concerning the setting-up of the France-Mali shipowners' committee, which states that: 'action by the Mali authorities is necessary to determine the penalties for any failure to comply with the trade rules concerned. (. . .) In a system of sharing based on cooperation between national shipowners in the two partner countries, penalties apply essentially to shipowners. But shippers also have obligations, in particular that of indicating on the bill of lading the destination in Mali of goods. Failure to comply with this obligation should also be penalized. Several examples of decisions imposing penalties have been made available to the Mali authorities'. The examples in question concern infringements in trade other than the France-Mali trade, where shipowners' committees were already in operation;
letter of 29 July 1988 to the Director-General of the National Transport Office (Mali) and the Chairman of the Mali Shipping Company from the French national line (SNCDV-Delmas, Société Navale de l'Ouest et Société Navale Caennaise) in which the latter expresses pleasure at the 'successful outcome of its recent talks with its Mali partners which resulted in the signing of an agreement on the organization of the liner trade between France and Mali. It hopes the agreement will be reflected in an official organization of the liner trade between the two countries to the advantage of both parties. It assures its Mali partners of its full cooperation in this field in order to achieve the anticipated results and hopes that its partners will, for their part, adopt as soon as possible the necessary legislation to allow full monitoring of the organization of the trade and the correction of any irregularities which might occur';
minutes of the meeting on 30 June 1987 of the France-Burkina Shipowners' Committee, 'SNCDV raised the problem of monitoring and controlling the trade. (. . .) Secrétama asked what happened when unstamped manifests were presented. SNCDV said that in other countries there was solidarity between customs and the Shippers' Council which enabled the trade to be strictly controlled. In reply to a question from SNO, Mr Bouda stated that a decree on penalties had been drafted. . . In reply to another question from SNO, the CBC stated that the penalty would apply to shipowners';
minutes of the meeting on 9 December 1987 of the France-Gabon Shipowners' Committee: 'SNCDV again referred to the lack of legislation imposing penalties at the Gabon end. It said that the French would like to know the penalties imposed for deflections of trade. It emphasized that, because of the liberal trend prevailing in Europe and to guarantee results, the French company was obliged to rely on its Gabon partners and on the introduction of certain laws in Africa'.
It can be concluded from several documents in the file that the fact that the African authorities adopted rules imposing fines on shipowners failing to comply with the rules of the shipowners' committees does not mean that the penalties were actually applied by the authorities. This is why the members of the committees made efforts to secure their effective application. This is clear from the following documents:
minutes of the meeting on 6 May 1987 of the France-Senegal Committee: 'the shipowners insisted on the fact that, under present arrangements, infringements could be checked only at the destination, chiefly by examining manifests. Cosenam considered for its part that the fines were not sufficient to dissuade Maersk Line from loading cargo. SNCDV then suggested that the shipping companies contact the Senegalese Customs. It was agreed to arrange a meeting between a shipowners' delegation, the Senegalese Merchant Navy and the Customs Directorate';
minutes of the meeting on 11 September 1986 of the same Committee: 'SNCDV again repeated its request for inspections of cargoes carried by outsiders from France. Mr Sarr(16) stated that, in his opinion, it was for the French authorities to take steps to prevent such cargoes being loaded. The chairman replied that, as matters stood, the French authorities could not be relied on to take such steps. SNO said it was necessary to be realistic. A certain number of rules governing the operation of the shipowners' committee had been adopted; the means of penalizing infringements lay in Senegal rather than France'. It thus seems that, in the case in point, a French shipping company (SNCDV-Delmas) had, at the meeting preceding the one in question, requested that an outsider, i.e. a shipping company not approved by the shipowners' committee, be penalized for having carried cargo to Senegal. Apparently its request had not been acted on. This was why SNO, seconding the SNCDV request, was calling for traffic leaving France to be controlled at its destination in Senegal.
(d)Involvement of the shipowners' committees in the imposition of fines
The penalties without which the discipline imposed by the shipowners' committees would be ineffective can be imposed only in close cooperation with those committees. All vessels leaving France for one of the African States covered by the activities of a shipowners' committee are required to submit their manifests for stamping by the secretariat of that committee. The absence of a stamp entails a fine on arrival at the destination. This emerges from a telex dated 21 November 1988 from the Togo National Shippers' Council (TNSC) to the non-committee company Maersk: 'the vessel Maersk Mango 8815 which sailed from Marseilles was penalized for failure to obtain the Secrétama stamp. Before a company loads in a French port, it is required to apply to the Secrétama representatives to obtain a loading authorization in the form of a stamp placed on the manifest'. Consequently, the TNSC had forms printed which were sent on several occasions to shipping companies in breach and which state the amount of the fine imposed; the forms are headed as follows: 'freight charges for goods loaded on M/S (name of vessel) without the Secrétama stamp'.