UNION INTEREST
(128)
The purpose of safeguard measures is to remedy or prevent serious injury that has occurred as a result of increased imports. In accordance with Article 16 of Regulation 2015/478, the Commission has also examined whether any compelling economic reasons exist which could lead to the conclusion that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures.
(129)
For this purpose, the impact of possible measures on all Union producers, importers and users of the product concerned and the possible consequences of taking or not taking the measures were considered based on the evidence available. Where necessary, the Commission devised a mechanism which would prevent serious injury from occurring whilst permitting traditional trade flows in a way compatible with a continued competitive functioning of the steel market.
7.1.
Interest of the Union producers
(130)
It was provisionally concluded that imposing safeguard measures would be in the interest of Union producers as it would prevent any serious injury caused by a further and significant increase of imports. After the imposition of provisional measures, the Commission did not receive any comments from the Union producers contradicting this view. The provisional conclusions were therefore confirmed.
7.2.
Interest of the Union importers and users
(131)
The Commission sent questionnaires to known importers and users in order to evaluate their interest.
(132)
The Commission received 61 responses from importers and 70 responses from users other than those related to importers. Importers and users also made their views known both orally and in writing.
(133)
Several Union importers and users claimed that the imposition of the safeguard measures would not be in the interest of the Union because it would increase import prices and restrict competition on the Union market. They also claimed that the imposition of measures would result in shortages of supply since, allegedly, the Union producers are not producing all types of steel products or not in sufficient quantities to supply the Union demand. This is, allegedly, further exacerbated by the fact that the availability of some products in the Union is restricted because they are subject to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures.
(134)
After the imposition of provisional measures, several Union users and importers argued that, if definitive measures should be taken, the following elements should be considered:
A quota level established on the basis of the average of the last three years should be increased by 10 %, as it was done as regards the Union steel safeguard measures in 2002, in order to accommodate for the likely increase in demand in downstream sectors;
Any quota should be allocated to each specific supplying country instead of a ‘first-come-first-serve’ allocation, in order to maintain traditional trade flows and avoid that certain supplying countries might take advantage of their geographic position or export capacities to fill up rapidly the quota and crowd out other traditional supplying countries;
Economic certainty should be ensured by establishing a quota system based on licenses. This would ensure continuity of supply and guarantee that shipments go through the tariff free quota the moment they leave the exporting country. Alternatively, it was claimed that the yearly quota should be established on a quarterly basis in order to avoid massive imports at the beginning of the year, which would be detrimental to users that are not in a position to build up stocks and need to be supplied on a stable basis throughout the year.
Some product types should be subject to separate quotas due to their specificities as compared to other product types falling within the same category. For these products, quotas should further be increased on a regular basis in order to reflect the expected significant increase of demand in the Union market in the next years.
(135)
The Commission examined in detail these claims and came to the following conclusions.
(136)
First, as already established in the provisional Regulation, the Commission agrees with the fact that traditional trade flows should be maintained as far as possible. Based on the above conclusions of the existence of a threat of serious injury, only imports in excess of these traditional trade flows would cause serious injury to the Union industry. With safeguard measures established under the form of a Tariff Rate Quota, the Commission considers that effective competition between imports and the Union industry will be maintained, and that the risk of general price increases and of any shortage is unlikely. Indeed, with such a form of measures, it is expected that imports will continue at traditional non-injurious levels, and the safeguard measures would only apply if, and when, the level of the quota is reached and the threat materialises.
(137)
Furthermore, the Union industry claimed it is able to manufacture all types of steel products. In any event, imports will be maintained – without measures – at their traditional levels, and are still possible above the quota, albeit subject to safeguard measures.
(138)
As to the existence of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures, their objective is to remedy unfair trade practices. While these measures may indeed have an impact on the level of exports from some supplying countries, this does not affect the level of fairly-priced imports that would have entered the Union market absent injurious dumping or subsidisation practices. This issue, and in particular the cumulation of safeguard with anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures, is considered under recital (186).
(139)
For the above reasons, the claims made by the parties as outlined in recital (133) are hereby rejected.
(140)
As to the claims concerning the form and level of measures, the Commission considered the following elements.
Level of the tariff-rate quota
(141)
While users and importers consider that any tariff-rate quota should be established at a level of 10 % above the average imports in the last three years since Union steel consumption in certain product categories is likely to experience double-digit growth rates, Union producers claimed that Union steel consumption will remain relatively flat in the coming years.
(142)
According to Article 15(3) of Regulation 2015/478, any quota shall, in principle, be set at the average level of imports over the last three representative years. This provision, however, applies in case measures take the form of a quota. As confirmed by the relevant jurisprudence, a tariff-rate quota is not a quantitative restriction under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, and therefore, the Commission is not as such bound to establish the level of the tariff-rate quota in this particular case at a level strictly corresponding to the average imports over the last three years.
(143)
In view of the claims raised in recital (141) above, and in line with the large economic, political, and legal discretion afforded to the Commission pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and 13 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755, the Commission considered it necessary to modulate the tariff-rate quota level above the average import level for the last three years to take account of the competing interests between users and importers, on the one hand, and the Union industry, on the other hand. In this regard, as evidenced under recital (32), the Commission notes that imports of the product categories concerned rose by 4 % from 2017 to the MRP without causing serious injury. The outlook for a future, albeit flatter, import growth rate under normal market conditions, coupled with the economic and political interests of the Union industry as a whole, accordingly mandate for the imposition of a quantitative level of the tariff-rate quota just above the average import level during the period 2017 to the MRP.
(144)
On this basis, and in order to limit the increase of imports to a level that is unlikely to cause serious injury to the Union industry whilst, at the same time, ensuring that traditional trade flows are maintained and existing user and importing industry sufficiently supported, the Commission considers that the quantitative level of the tariff-rate quota should be based on the average imports in the period 2015-2017 plus 5 %.
Allocation of the tariff-rate quotas
(145)
Almost all interested parties, including the Union industry, argued in favour of an allocation of tariff-rate quotas to specific supplying countries instead of a global quota system as established at provisional stage.
(146)
The Commission agrees that a country-specific tariff-rate quota system is indeed the most appropriate system to ensure traditional trade flows. It has however some limitations. First, the number of supplying countries is significant for each product category. It is not reasonably practicable to allocate a tariff-rate quota to each of them. Second, the Commission considers that it is necessary, for an adequate tariff-rate quota allocation, to take into account special factors that will affect the trade in the products concerned. Indeed, for a number of products falling within the scope of this investigation, the Union has recently imposed anti-dumping/countervailing duty measures on certain exporting countries. This has often resulted in a significant decrease of imports from these countries in the most recent year, and will continue to do so during the period of imposition of these measures. A country-specific tariff-rate quota for these countries will therefore more than likely be used only marginally since the level of the tariff-rate quota is based on the average level of imports in the years 2015-2017, i.e. including a period when anti-dumping/countervailing duty measures were not yet in place and the level of import was significant due to unfair trade practices. It would, therefore, not be in the Union interest to allocate a country specific tariff-rate quota in these circumstances since the level of future imports would unavoidably be below their traditional trade levels.
(147)
The Commission concluded that, given the above circumstances, a mixed approach would be the most appropriate. First, a country specific tariff-rate quota should be allocated to countries having a significant supplying interest, based on their imports over the last 3 years. For the purpose of this regulation, it is considered that countries with a share of more than 5 % of imports for the product category concerned have a significant supplying interest. A global tariff-rate quota (‘the residual quota’) based on the average of the remaining imports over the last three years should be allocated to all other supplying countries.
(148)
A country specific tariff-rate quota should however not be allocated to those countries whose export level – for each product category concerned – has substantially diminished in the recent past because of anti-dumping/countervailing duty measures in place for the above reasons. These countries should fall within the residual tariff-rate quota.
(149)
In the specific case of product category 1 (hot rolled coils), since close to 60 % of imports are currently covered by anti-dumping measures, the Commission considers that a global quota and no country-specific allocation is the most appropriate.
(150)
Finally, the Commission considers that it is also in the Union interest that when a supplying country has exhausted its specific tariff-rate quota, it should be allowed to have access to the residual tariff-rate quota. This possibility should however only be applied during the last quarter of the period, in order to strike a balance between the interests of the countries endowed with a country specific tariff-rate quota and the countries drawing on the global tariff-rate quota. This would not only ensure the maintenance of traditional trade flows but also avoid that, as the case may be, parts of the residual tariff-rate quota would remain unused.
Predictability of the tariff-rate quota over time
(151)
The Commission considers that the introduction of a licensing system is not necessary to ensure predictability.
(152)
First, data concerning the development of imports under the tariff-rate quota and the free of duty quota usage is publically available and updated on a daily basis. The data on the tariff-rate quota usage can be found at the following web address:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp
(153)
Furthermore, a country-specific allocation should also ensure an additional level of predictability for traditional suppliers and users. In addition, when a country-specific tariff-rate quota is exhausted, the country in question will be in a position to export through the available residual quota, although only during the last quarter of the period, which is the most critical period in terms of quota availability.
(154)
Finally, the Commission considers that the residual tariff-rate quota should be divided quarterly in order to ensure that imports are evenly distributed over the year and prevent that significant imports of standard products are stockpiled at the beginning of the period in order to avoid possible duties. Unused quarterly tariff-rate quota allocations would also be automatically transferred to the next period.
Product classification
(155)
The Commission has examined the claims made by users and importers to create specific sub-categories for their products. In particular, the Commission has found that two product categories, namely category 3 and 4, present distinct characteristics for which the claims are acceptable.
(156)
Category 4 – corrosion resistant sheets – include both products produced specifically for the automotive industry, based on precise product specifications and subject to long term contracts, and other standard products. For the former products, suppliers need first to obtain a certification necessary to supply the industry over a long time period, based on a just-in-time system. For this product category, the Commission acknowledges that there is a risk that some specific product types are crowded out from the free of duty quota by standard products that can be massively supplied and stockpiled at the beginning of the year.
(157)
Furthermore, the standard types of products under this product category are currently subject to anti-dumping duties, which also have an impact on future import developments as well as quota allocation, based on what is explained above. The fact that these more specialised products were not covered in the industry's request for anti-dumping measures is also an indication that these products should be considered separately from the standard types of products.
(158)
As far as category 3 – electrical sheets – is concerned, the relevant user industry also claimed that some specialised products, i.e. non-grain oriented electrical sheets, should be separated from other products in this category. This claim is based on the fact that these product types are strategic for the Union economy, as they are used in the new energy/mobility sectors (e.g. new energy vehicles, wind turbines). Users and importers claim that these products are high-value, specialty products, with the risk that they are crowded out by standard products included in the same product category. In addition, users also claimed that the Union demand is likely to increase significantly in the near future and that the specific quota should be increased accordingly in the future. Even though the latter claim could not be duly supported by any evidence, a separate quota for these products would allow examining further duly substantiated requests in the future.
(159)
The Commission further considers that, without undermining whatsoever the remedial effect of the measure, it is possible to create sub-sets of products within these two existing product categories, which would accordingly be allocated their own quota.
(160)
On the basis of the above, the Commission accepted the claims to split product category 4 (metallic coated sheets) and product category number 3 (electrical sheets (other than GOES)) into two sub-categories.
Review clause
(161)
Finally, the Commission considers that, based on the Union interest, it may have to adjust the level or allocation of the tariff-rate quota as set out in Annexes IV.1 and IV.2 in case of changes of circumstances during the period of imposition of the measures. Such review could concern any product category subject to measures, including (but not limited) to the product categories 3, 4, 6 and 16 that were subject to detailed and substantiated submissions during the investigation as well as in the context of the bilateral consultations held by the Commission. The changed circumstances could, for example, materialise in the case of an overall increase or contraction in Union demand for some product categories that would require a reassessment of the level of the tariff-rate quota, the imposition of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures that may significantly affect future import developments, or even any development concerning the US Section 232 that may have a direct impact on the conclusions of this investigation, namely in terms of trade diversion. The Commission may also review whether the operation of the measures could have detrimental effects in achieving the integration objectives pursued with preferential trading partners, such as substantially risking their stabilisation or economic development. The Commission will carry out an assessment of the situation on a regular basis, and consider a review at least at the end of each year of imposition of measures. The Commission shall initiate the first review investigation no later than on 1 July 2019.
7.3.
Conclusion on Union Interest
(162)
Based on the above considerations, and a careful examination of the various interests at stake, the Commission concludes that the Union interest requires the adoption of definitive safeguard measures under the form of a tariff rate quota, in order to prevent further deterioration in the situation of the Union producers.