61 3. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF SUBSIDISATION › 3.2. Subsidies and subsidy programmes examined in the current investigation › 3.2.2. The provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration › 3.2.2.2. Continuation of the subsidy program, Regulation (EU) 2026/479

In forcesince 3 Mar 2026

The applicant claimed that the GOI has maintained such subsidy schemes since 2019 [Request, para. 101.]. Besides the export restraint regimes, the GOI has kept on intervening in the Indonesian market to de facto control the CPO prices through the PTPN, a public body and State-owned company fully controlled by the GOI [Request, para. 102.]. Through daily auctions, the PTPN has acted de facto as a price setter for CPO according to the GOI’s aim of keeping CPO domestic prices lower so that the downstream industries – namely the biodiesel industry – could benefit from it [Request, paras. 103–105.]. By so doing, the GOI supported and artificially stimulated the Indonesian biodiesel industry. It follows that, according to the applicant, Indonesian CPO suppliers were entrusted or directed by the GOI to provide input materials to the domestic users of CPO, namely Indonesian biodiesel producers, for less than adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation [Request, paras. 106 and 112.]. The applicant concluded that the GOI has put in place a system that creates a high demand for biodiesel through the blending mandate [Request, para. 121.], with CPO producers consequently being responsible for an artificially low-priced domestic CPO market [Request, para. 106.].