3 ANNEX Ib TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR WALLET UNIT ATTESTATIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 6(2A), Regulation (EU) 2024/2979

In forcesince 11 Aug 2026
1.

A wallet unit attestation shall comprise one or more wallet instance attestations and one or more key attestations.

2.

The wallet instance attestation and the key attestations shall meet the following requirements:

(a)

Format requirements

FR-WIA-1: A wallet instance attestation shall be a JSON Web Token (JWT) as specified in RFC 7519 [RFC 7519: JSON Web Token (JWT), May 2015.], signed or sealed by the wallet provider by means of compact JAdES baseline B signature.

FR-WIA-1.1: A wallet instance attestation shall be a wallet attestation as specified in Appendix E of OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance v1.0 [OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance v1.0, https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-credential-issuance-1_0.html.] ('OID4VCI') and extended as specified in C-WIA-1 and C-WIA-2 below.

FR-KA-1: A key attestation shall be a JWT as specified in RFC 7519, signed or sealed by the wallet provider by means of compact JAdES baseline B signature.

FR_KA_1.1: A key attestation shall be a key attestation as specified in Appendix D of OID4VCI, extended as specified in C_KA-1 and C_KA-2 below.

(b)

Transport requirements

TR-WIA-1: A wallet unit shall use a wallet instance attestation during the issuance of person identification data, qualified or non-qualified electronic attestations of attributes, or electronic attestations of attributes, provided by or on behalf of a public sector body responsible for an authentic source.

TR-WIA-2: A wallet provider shall verify the integrity of the wallet instance and sign or seal the wallet instance attestation.

TR-WIA-2.1: Where a wallet provider issues a wallet instance attestation, the difference between the time when the wallet provider verified the integrity of the wallet instance and the time they will indicate in the 'exp' header parameter of the issued wallet instance attestation shall be less than 24 hours.

TR-WIA-2.2: The wallet provider shall ensure that a wallet unit contains wallet instance attestations as needed for issuance of person identification data and electronic attestations of attributes.

TR-WIA-3: During issuance, a wallet unit shall send a wallet instance attestation to the authorisation server in the pushed authorisation request and the token request, as specified in OID4VCI.

TR-WIA-3.1: A wallet unit shall send the wallet instance attestation together with a Proof-of-Possession ('PoP') as specified in Appendix E of OID4VCI.

TR-WIA-3.2: A wallet unit shall send the same wallet instance attestation to only one authorisation server.

TR-WIA-3.2.1: Where a wallet provider uses the 'per-issuer reuse' option specified in R_WIA_1 below, a wallet unit may send a wallet instance attestation to the same authorisation server multiple times.

TR-WIA-3.2.2: Where a wallet provider does not use the 'per-issuer reuse' option, a wallet unit shall use a wallet instance attestation in at most one issuance process.

TR-WIA-4: Where an authorisation server receives a wallet instance attestation, it shall verify the signature of the wallet instance attestation using the public key in the signing certificate included in the 'x5c' parameter in the JOSE header of the wallet instance attestation.

TR-WIA-4.1: The authorisation server shall also verify that this signing certificate can be verified with a trust anchor on the list of wallet providers referred to in Article 5 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2980, potentially using intermediate certificates included in the x5c parameter.

TR-WIA-4.2: The authorisation server shall verify that the wallet instance attestation has not expired.

TR-WIA-4.3: The authorisation server shall verify the signature of the PoP under the public key present in the 'cnf' claim.

TR_KA-1: A wallet unit shall use a key attestation during the issuance of person identification data and during the issuance of device-bound qualified or non-qualified electronic attestations of attributes, or electronic attestations of attributes provided by or on behalf of a public sector body responsible for an authentic source.

TR_KA-1.1: A wallet unit shall not use a key attestation during the issuance of non-device-bound qualified or non-qualified electronic attestations of attributes, or electronic attestations of attributes provided by or on behalf of a public sector body responsible for an authentic source.

TR_KA-2: A wallet provider shall provide a wallet unit with different key attestations for the WSCD of the wallet unit and for each of its keystores.

TR_KA-2.1: The wallet provider shall sign or seal a key attestation, after the wallet provider has verified that the keys attested to in the key attestation are stored in the WSCD of the wallet unit or keystore described in the key attestation.

TR_KA-2.2: A key attestation shall contain at least one attested public key. The number of keys in the key attestation sent to a credential issuer should not exceed the maximum batch size specified by that credential issuer in its Credential Issuer metadata; see ETSI TS 119 472-3 [ETSI, ‘Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); JAdES digital signatures; Part 3: JAdES levels and baseline profiles’, ETSI TS 119 472-3, V1.1.1, March 2026.], parameter 'credential_configurations_supported. credential_metadata.credential_reuse_policy.options.batch_size'.

TR_KA-2.3: A wallet provider shall include a public key (corresponding to a private key stored in the WSCD or keystore of the wallet unit) in at most one key attestation.

TR_KA-2.4: A wallet unit shall use a key attestation during at most one credential issuance or re-issuance process.

TR_KA-2.5: A wallet provider shall ensure that a wallet unit is in possession of key attestations as needed for issuance of person identification data and device-bound electronic attestations of attributes.

TR_KA-3: Where needed during issuance, a wallet unit shall include a key attestation in the field 'proofs' of a Credential Request to the credential issuer, as specified in OID4VCI, in a proof of either type 'jwt' or type 'attestation'.

TR_KA_3.1: Where a wallet unit includes a key attestation in a 'jwt' element, it shall sign or seal the key attestation using the private key corresponding to the public key at index 0 of the 'attested_keys' array within the 'key_attestation' object.

TR_KA-4: Where a credential issuer issues device-bound credentials, it shall indicate in the 'proof_types_supported' parameter in its Issuer Credential Metadata, as specified in Section 12.2.4 OID4VCI, that it supports both the 'jwt' and the 'attestation' proof type for key attestations that shall include the 'key_attestations_required' object.

TR_KA-4.1: Where a credential issuer issues non-device-bound credentials, it shall omit the 'proof_types_supported' and the 'cryptographic_binding_methods_supported' parameters in the Credential Issuer Metadata.

TR_KA-5: Where a credential issuer receives a key attestation in a 'jwt' or an 'attestation' proof type, it shall verify the signature of the key attestation under the public key in the signing certificate included in the 'x5c' parameter in the JOSE header of the key attestation and that this signing certificate with a trust anchor on the list for wallet providers referred to in Article 5 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2980, potentially using intermediate certificates included in the 'x5c' parameter.

TR_KA-6: Where a credential issuer receives a key attestation in a 'jwt' proof type, it shall verify the signature of the 'jwt' element under the key at index 0 of the 'attested_keys' array within the 'key_attestation' object included in the 'jwt' element.

TR_KA-6.1: The credential issuer shall verify that the 'nonce' field of the 'jwt' element includes a valid c_nonce from their nonce_endpoint, as specified in OID4VCI.

TR_KA-7: Where a credential issuer receives a key attestation in an 'attestation' proof type, it shall verify that the 'key_attestation' object includes a valid c_nonce from their nonce_endpoint.

TR_KA-8: A provider of person identification data shall ensure that person identification data is bound to a public key that originates from a key attestation mentioning a WSCD.

(c)

Content requirements

C_WIA-1: A wallet instance attestation shall include the following:

the 'wallet_name' claim specified in Appendix E of OID4VCI, where its value shall be the identifier of the wallet solution that can be found on the list of wallet providers referred to in Article 5 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2980.

a 'wallet_version' claim [This claim is defined in this CIR as it is not part of the OID4VCI specification.], that shall be a string whose value shall be the version of the wallet solution.

a 'wallet_solution_certification_information' claim, that shall be a JSON object containing information about the conformity assessment body that certified the wallet solution, the certification number, as applicable, and other relevant details as regards certification.

a 'client_status' claim, containing two sub-fields:

'status': a status list reference as specified in Appendix E of OID4VCI that represents the revocation status of the wallet instance. See section (e) below for details;

'exp': a NumericDate, as specified in RFC 7519, defining the time until which the wallet provider will maintain the revocation status at the status list index referenced in 'status'.

the 'exp' claim specified in Appendix E of OID4VCI.

NOTE: The 'client_status.status' claim in a wallet instance attestation represents the revocation status of the wallet instance, not the revocation status of the attestation itself. As described in R_WIA-1 below, a wallet provider can decide to scope each wallet instance attestation to a specific authorisation server based on the fact that all attestations sent to that server contain the same index value in the 'client_status.status' entry.

NOTE: The 'idx' value in the 'status' claim can be used as a (pairwise) unique identifier of the wallet instance and of the wallet unit.

C_WIA-2: A wallet instance attestation should also include the 'wallet_link' claim specified in Appendix E of OID4VCI and the value of this claim shall be a URI where further information about the wallet solution can be obtained.

C_WIA-3: An authorization server shall not interpret the 'exp' parameter in the top level of a wallet instance attestation as the end of the revocation maintenance period of the wallet instance.

NOTE: The 'exp' parameter in the top level of a wallet instance attestation denotes when the attestation itself expires.

C_KA-1: A key attestation shall include:

the 'key_storage' and 'user_authentication' claims specified in Appendix D of OID4VCI.

The 'key_storage' and 'user_authentication' attributes shall have value 'iso_18045_high' where a key attestation mentions a WSCD,

the 'certification' claim specified in Appendix D of OID4VCI, containing a URL where information can be obtained about the certification achieved by the WSCD or keystore, indicatively the scheme such as Common Criteria or GlobalPlatform, the evaluated requirements such as the applicable Protection Profile, and the evaluation level.

It shall be possible to determine from this information whether the key storage is a WSCD.

a 'key_storage_status' claim, containing two sub-fields:

'status': a status list reference as specified in Appendix D.1 of OID4VCI. The value represents either the revocation status of the WSCD or keystore type used to store the attested keys, or -- under the per-key-attestation index option -- the revocation status of an individual wallet unit's WSCD or keystore. See R_KA_1 below for the available index assignment options;

'exp': a NumericDate, as specified in RFC 7519, defining the time until which the wallet provider will maintain the revocation status at the status list index referenced in 'status'.

the 'exp' claim specified in Appendix D of OID4VCI.

NOTE on the 'idx' value in the 'key_storage_status.status' claim in a key attestation: Where the wallet provider uses the 'type-shared index' option (see R_KA_1 below), all key attestations for the same type of WSCD or keystore share the same status list index. Therefore, the 'idx' value is not unique per wallet unit. On the contrary, where the wallet provider uses the 'per-key-attestation index' option, the 'idx' value is unique to the wallet unit (or pairwise unique per credential issuer). In all cases, however, a credential issuer shall not use the 'idx' value in a key attestation as a wallet unit identifier, but shall instead use the 'idx' value in a wallet instance attestation.

C_KA-2: Where a key attestation is sent in an 'attestation' proof type, it shall also include a valid c_nonce as specified in Appendix F.3 of OID4VCI.

C_KA-3: A credential issuer shall not interpret the 'exp' parameter in the top level of a key attestation as the end of the revocation maintenance period of the WSCD or keystore.

NOTE: The 'exp' parameter in the top level of a key attestation denotes when the key attestation itself expires.

(d)

Life cycle requirements

This Annex specifies the following Credential Issuer metadata parameters:

'preferred_client_status_period': OPTIONAL. An integer specifying the preferred remaining status maintenance period of the wallet instance attestation to be presented by the wallet unit during issuance, in seconds. The remaining status maintenance period is defined as the value of 'client_status.exp' in the attestation minus the time of reception of the attestation.

'preferred_key_storage_status_period': OPTIONAL. An integer specifying the preferred remaining status maintenance period of the key attestation to be presented by the wallet unit during issuance, in seconds. The remaining status maintenance period is defined as the value 'key_storage_status.exp' in the attestation minus the time of reception of the attestation.

LC_WIA-1: An authorisation server may communicate its preferences for the remaining status maintenance period in wallet instance attestations by including the 'preferred_client_status_period' metadata parameter in their Credential Issuer metadata endpoint as specified in Section 12.2.2 of OID4VCI.

LC_WIA-1.1: This field shall be placed at the top level of the Credential Issuer metadata.

LC_WIA_2: An authorisation server shall not interpret the 'exp' parameter in the top level of a wallet instance attestation as the end of the revocation maintenance period of the wallet instance.

LC_WIA_3: Where a wallet provider signs or seals a wallet instance attestation, it shall maintain the revocation status of the relevant wallet instance until the 'wallet_instance_status.exp' indicated in that wallet instance attestation has passed.

LC_KA-1: Where a key attestation is needed, a credential issuer may communicate its preferences for the remaining status maintenance period in key attestations by including the 'preferred_key_storage_status_period' metadata parameter specified above in their Credential Issuer Metadata endpoint as specified in Section 12.2.2 of OID4VCI.

LC_KA-1.1: This field shall be placed within the 'key_attestations_required' object as specified in Section 12.2.4 of OID4VCI.

LC_KA-2: A wallet provider shall choose the technical validity period of the key attestations it issues.

LC_KA-3: Where a wallet provider signs or seals a key attestation, it shall maintain the revocation status of the relevant WSCD or keystore until the 'key_storage_status.exp' indicated in that key attestation has passed.

LC_GEN-1: A wallet provider shall ensure that a wallet unit can always present wallet unit attestations and key attestations whose 'client_status.exp' and 'key_storage_status.exp' (respectively) are at least 31 days in the future at the time of presentation to an authorization server or credential issuer.

NOTE: This guarantees that providers of person identification data can rely on revocation chaining without being forced to issue short-lived person identification data.

LC_GEN-2: A wallet provider shall ensure that a wallet unit fetches the Credential Issuer metadata during issuance.

LC_GEN_2.1: If a 'preferred_key_storage_status_period' field is included in this metadata, then the wallet unit shall send a key attestation with ('key_storage_status.exp' – current time) – 'preferred_key_storage_status_period' as small as possible but non-negative. If no such key attestation is available to the wallet unit, it shall obtain a new key attestation from the wallet provider that satisfies 'key_storage_status.exp' – current time ≥ 'preferred_key_storage_status_period'.

LC_GEN_2.2: If a 'preferred_client_status_period' field is included in this metadata, then the wallet unit shall send a wallet instance attestation with ('client_status.exp' – current time) – 'preferred_client_status_period' as small as possible but non-negative. If no such wallet instance attestation is available to the wallet unit, it shall request a new wallet instance attestation from the wallet provider that satisfies 'client_status.exp' – current time ≥ 'preferred_client_status_period'.

LC_GEN-3: The technical validity period of person identification data shall end before both the 'client_status.exp' of the wallet instance attestation and the 'key_storage_status.exp' of the key attestation sent to the provider of person identification data in the issuance process.

LC_GEN-4: A provider of person identification data having a technical validity period of more than 24 hours shall check the revocation status of both the wallet instance attestation and the key attestation received during issuance at least once every 24 hours, during the technical validity period of the person identification data. Where either is revoked, the provider shall revoke the person identification data.

(e)

Revocation requirements

R_GEN-1: A wallet provider shall use Token Status Lists (specified in IETF Token Status List) as the revocation mechanism for both key attestations and wallet instance attestations, as specified in OID4VCI Appendix D and E, respectively.

NOTE: To improve scalability of its status lists, a wallet provider can use the following optimisations:

Dividing the status list into multiple chunks, where the wallet providers have a sizeable number of users and issued attestations. Many chunking strategies exist, for example based on a fixed size or by time period. The strategy for chunking is left to wallet provider discretion. Considerations can include the size of a status list for downloading and the privacy of the user.

Having multiple status lists.

Compressing a status list to reduce its size.

R_WIA-1: A wallet provider may assign the same value to the 'idx' claim in the 'client_status.status' claim in all wallet instance attestations that a given wallet unit presents to the same authorization server. This is called the 'per-issuer reuse' option. If this option is used:

R_WIA-1.1: The wallet unit shall maintain state on which index value it has used for each authorization server it has previously interacted with, and shall request a wallet instance attestation containing that same index value when interacting with the same authorization server again.

R_WIA-1.2: Where a wallet provider receives a request for a wallet instance attestation containing a specific index value, it shall verify that the requesting wallet unit has received that index value previously, before issuing a new wallet instance attestation with that index value.

R_WIA-1.3: The wallet unit shall not reuse the same index value for interactions with different authorization servers.

NOTE: If the 'per-issuer reuse' option is used, the wallet provider will be able to determine how many authorization servers a wallet unit has interacted with and how frequently it interacts with each.

R_WIA-2: In its privacy policy, a wallet provider shall document whether it uses the 'per-issuer reuse' option for wallet instance revocation.

R_WIA-3: Where a wallet provider does not use the 'per-issuer reuse' option, the wallet provider shall assign a fresh, unlinkable index value to each wallet instance attestation it issues.

R_WIA-4: Where a wallet unit must be revoked, a wallet provider shall revoke the index values in the 'client_status.status' claim in all wallet instance attestations associated with that wallet unit.

R_WIA-5: A wallet provider shall take into consideration the scale of its deployment and the underlying architecture when determining the size of its wallet instance attestation status lists, ensuring that they are sufficiently large to prevent correlation and protect user privacy. At a minimum, a status list shall, where possible, relate to at least 10000 attestations.

R_KA_1: A wallet provider shall choose one of the following index assignment options for the 'key_storage_status.status' claim in a key attestation:

Option 1, called 'type-shared index', in which all key attestations attesting keys stored in the same type of WSCD or keystore contain the same index value in 'key_storage_status.status'.

Option 2, called 'per-key-attestion index', in which a key attestation attesting keys stored in an individual WSCD or keystore contains a (pairwise) unique index value in 'key_storage_status.status'.

NOTE: Where a wallet provider uses option 1, a single revocation action invalidates all key attestations of the affected type across all wallet units. Moreover, because all key attestations for the same type of WSCD or keystore share a single status list index, the number of entries in a key attestation status list reflects the number of WSCD or keystore types supported by the wallet provider, not the number of deployed wallet units. The privacy considerations that motivate the minimum status list size for wallet instance status lists therefore do not apply to key attestation status lists under option 1, provided that there are sufficiently many wallet units using the same type of WSCD or keystore.

NOTE: Where a wallet provider uses option 2, each index represents the revocation state of the specific WSCD or keystore attested in that key attestation.

NOTE: Where a wallet provider uses option 2, a specific WSCD or keystore can also be revoked on User request.

R_KA-2: Where a wallet provider uses option 2, the wallet provider may optionally use the 'per-issuer reuse' option described in R_WIA-1. If the wallet provider uses this option, the requirements R_WIA-1 - R_WIA-3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

R_KA-3: Where a wallet provider uses option 2, the wallet provider shall take into consideration the scale of its deployment and the underlying architecture when determining the size of its key attestation status lists, ensuring that they are sufficiently large to prevent correlation and protect user privacy. At a minimum, a status list shall, where possible, relate to at least 10000 key attestations.

This article is long: the rest is at the official publication.