In that investigation, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles [Ibid., recitals (161)–(162), (167).]. In particular, the Commission concluded that in the glass fibre sector, including GFR not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation [Ibid., recitals (116)–(119).] but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation [Ibid., recitals (120)–(122). While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in state-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including the producers of aluminium foils and the suppliers of their inputs.]. The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs, have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces [Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492, recitals (123)–(138).]. Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC [Ibid., recitals (139)–(142).]. In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the glass fibre sector, including GFR, in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, [Ibid., recitals (143)–(145).] as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC [Ibid., recitals (146)–(155).].
43 3. DUMPING › 3.4. Existence of significant distortions, Regulation (EU) 2023/1452
In forcesince 13 Jul 2023
- celex=32020R0492
- num:eu=2020/492