In assessing potential vertical effects of a merger, the Commission analyses, among
other things, whether the merger results in foreclosure so that actual or potential 217 Form CO. table 143. 218 eRFI to competitors and distributors, question Q.1 219 eRFI to competitors and distributors, question J.1 220 The assessment is also relevant to other potential vertical links between the (i) upstream manufacturing of GM produced lactase and (ii) downstream enzymes distribution segments (GM and non-GM produced lactase, F&B enzymes and dairy enzymes) at national, EEA and global level. rivals’ access to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the merger, thereby reducing those companies’ ability and/or incentive to compete.221 Such foreclosure may discourage entry or expansion of rivals or encourage their exit. Foreclosure thus can be found even if the foreclosed rivals are not forced to exit the market. It is sufficient that the rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less effectively. Such foreclosure is regarded as anti-competitive where the merging companies — and, possibly, some of their competitors as well — are as a result able to profitably increase the price charged to consumers.