The INPS and the INAIL contend that the Commission's interpretation does not appear to be correct. In their opinion, although the Supreme Court of Cassation's judgments might potentially extend the aid without a limit in time to all beneficiaries identified under the relevant legislation, the judgments in fact merely make it clear that the benefit of the measures can be granted in two ways: if the undertaking has not yet paid, it need pay only 10 % of what is due; if it has already paid, it can obtain reimbursement of 90 % of what has been paid. The two institutions assert that this interpretation derives from the legislation that introduced the rebates. That legislation is jus superveniens, supervening law, which legitimises the refund of the amounts previously paid in excess. However, the INPS and the INAIL point out that in the first case (payment of 10 %) several judgments have found that taxpayers were not entitled to the benefit of the measure because they applied after the deadline of 31 July 2007 set by the law. In the second case (refund of 90 %), entitlement to the refund is subject to a period of limitation, which is normally 10 years from the moment when the entitlement can be exercised (Article 2946 of the Civil Code), i.e. from the entry into force of the law introducing the measure. Moreover, contrary to what is affirmed in paragraph 45 of the opening decision, the principles formulated by the Supreme Court of Cassation refer only to specific cases (Sicily and Piedmont) and cannot be applied generally to all other disasters, as suggested by the Commission.
92 5. COMMENTS FROM ITALY › Rebates and period of application for each area and measure, Decision_act (EU) 2016/195
In forcesince 14 Aug 2015