This TSI concerns the following subsystems as defined in Directive (EU) 2016/797: control-command and signalling (‘CCS’), infrastructure (‘INF’), energy (‘ENE’), operation (‘OPE’), and rolling stock (locomotives and passenger units ‘LOC&PAS’).
The purpose of this TSI is to define a coherent set of tunnel specific measures for the infrastructure, energy, rolling stock, control-command and signalling and operation subsystems, thus delivering an optimal level of safety in tunnels in the most cost-efficient way.
It shall permit free movement of vehicles which are in compliance with this TSI to run under harmonised safety conditions in railway tunnels.
Only measures, designed to reduce specific tunnel risks, are prescribed in the present TSI. Risks related to pure railway operation, such as derailment and collision with other trains, are addressed by general railway safety measures.
The existing safety level shall not be reduced in a country as stipulated in Directive 2004/49/EC Art 4.1. Member States can retain more stringent requirements, as long as these requirements do not prevent the operation of TSI compliant trains.
Member States can prescribe new and more stringent requirements for specific tunnels in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC Art 8; such requirements shall be notified to the Commission before they are introduced. Such higher requirements must be based on a risk analysis and must be justified by a particular risk situation. They shall be the result of a consultation of the Infrastructure Manager and of the relevant authorities for emergency response, and they shall be subject to a cost-benefit assessment.
This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded tunnels which are located on the network of the Union rail system, and which are in accordance with the definition in clause 2.4 of this TSI.
Stations that are in tunnels shall be in conformity with the national rules on fire safety. When they are used as safe areas, they shall comply only with the specifications for clauses 4.2.1.5.1, 4.2.1.5.2 and 4.2.1.5.3 of this TSI. When they are used as evacuation and rescue points, they shall comply only with the specifications of clauses 4.2.1.7 (c) and 4.2.1.7 (e) of this TSI.
This TSI applies to rolling stock which is in the scope of the LOC&PAS TSI.
Rolling stock categorised ‘A’ or ‘B’ according to the previous SRT TSI (Decision 2008/163/EC) shall retain its category in this TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3.
This TSI applies to the operation of all units of rolling stock which are running in tunnels described in clause 1.1.1.
When each vehicle of a freight train or dangerous goods train as defined in clause 2.4 complies with the structural TSIs which apply to it (LOC&PAS, SRT, NOI, CCS, WAG) and when the dangerous goods wagon(s) comply with Annex II of Directive 2008/68/EC, the freight train or dangerous goods train operated according to the requirements of the OPE TSI shall be allowed to circulate in all tunnels of the network of the Union rail system.
This TSI covers only specific risks to the safety of passengers and on-board staff in tunnels for the subsystems above.
Where a risk analysis comes to the conclusion that other tunnel incidents might be of relevance, specific measures to deal with these scenarios shall be defined.
Risks not covered by this TSI are as follows:
Health and safety of staff involved in maintenance of the fixed installations in tunnels.
Financial loss due to damage to structures and trains, and consequently the losses resulting from non-availability of the tunnel for repairs.
Trespass into the tunnel through the tunnel portals.
Terrorism, as a deliberate and premeditated act, which is designed to cause wanton destruction, injury and loss of life.
Risks for people in the neighbourhood of a tunnel where collapse of the structure could have catastrophic consequences.
The geographical scope of this TSI is the network of the Union rail system as described in Annex I of Directive (EU) 2016/797 with the exclusion of the cases referred to in Articles 1(3) and 1(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797.
The line of defence for the promotion of safety in tunnels comprises four successive layers: Prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue.
The largest contribution is in the area of prevention followed by mitigation and so on.
The layers of safety combine to produce a low level of residual risk.
A major feature of railways is their inherent ability to prevent accidents through the traffic running on a guide-way and generally being controlled and regulated using a signalling system.
This TSI provides measures which could prevent or mitigate the difficulty of evacuation or rescue operations following a tunnel-specific railway incident.
Relevant measures have been identified, which will control or significantly reduce the risks arising from the tunnel-specific incident scenarios identified above.
They have been developed, in the categories prevention/mitigation/evacuation/rescue; however they do not appear under these headings in this TSI but under the headings of the concerned subsystems.
The measures prescribed can be considered as a response to the following three types of incident.
The main danger is fire. Fire is understood as a combination of heat, flames and smoke.
The fire starts on a train.
The fire is detected, either by on-board fire detectors, or by persons on-board. The driver is notified of a problem, either that there is a fire by an automatic notification or that there is a problem in general by passengers using the passenger alarm.
The driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances.
Ventilation is shut down to prevent smoke distribution. For rolling stock of category B, the passengers in the affected area will move to a non-affected area of the train where they are protected from fire and fumes
Whenever possible the train leaves the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area in the open air.
If appropriate, the train may stop at a evacuation and rescue point inside the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area.
If a fire extinguishing system can extinguish the fire, the incident will become a ‘cold’ incident.
The fire starts in the tunnel.
If fire starts in a tunnel or in a technical room, the driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances in compliance with the tunnel-specific incident scenarios, described in the Emergency Plan.
The tunnel specific measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the intervention of the emergency response services.
The difference compared to the hot incidents is that there is no time constraint due to the presence of a hostile environment created by a fire.
Prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without the occurrence of a hot or cold incident, for longer than 10 minutes) is not by itself a threat to passengers and staff.
However it may lead to panic and to spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment.
The scenarios that have not been dealt with are listed in clause 1.1.4.
The definition of the role of the emergency response services is a matter for the relevant national legislation.
The measures specified in this TSI for rescue are based on the assumption that the emergency response services intervening in a tunnel incident shall protect lives as a priority.
It is assumed that they are expected to:
In a ‘hot’ incident type
Rescue people unable to reach a safe area
Provide initial medical support to evacuees
Fight a fire insofar as required to protect themselves and people caught in the incident
Conduct evacuation from safe areas inside the tunnel to the final place of safety
In a ‘cold’ incident type
Rescue people
Provide initial help to people with critical injuries
Free trapped people
Conduct evacuation to the final place of safety
No demands on time or performance requirements are included in this TSI.
Considering that incidents in railway tunnels involving multiple fatalities are rare, it is implicit that there might be events, with an extremely low probability, for which even well-equipped emergency response services would be restricted, such as a major fire involving a freight train.
If the expectations of the emergency response services expressed in emergency plans go beyond the assumptions described above, the need for additional measures or tunnel equipment can be considered.
For the purpose of this TSI the following definitions are used:
Railway tunnel: A railway tunnel is an excavation or a construction around the track provided to allow the railway to pass for example higher land, buildings or water. The length of a tunnel is defined as the length of the fully enclosed section, measured at rail level. A tunnel in the context of this TSI is 0.1 km or longer. Where certain requirements apply only to longer tunnels, thresholds are mentioned in the relevant clauses.
Safe area: a safe area is a temporary survivable space, inside or outside the tunnel, for passengers and staff to find refuge after they have evacuated from a train.
(b1) Final place of safety: the final place of safety is the place where passengers and staff will no longer be impacted by the effects of the initial incident (e.g. smoke opacity and toxicity, temperature). It is the termination point of the evacuation.
Evacuation and rescue point: an evacuation and rescue point is a defined location, inside or outside the tunnel, where fire fighting equipment can be used by the emergency response services and where passengers and staff can evacuate from a train.
Technical rooms: Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or outside the tunnel with safety installations which are necessary for at least one of the following functions: self-rescue, evacuation, emergency communication, rescue and fire fighting, signalling and communication equipment, and traction power supply.
Freight train: A freight train is a train composed of one or more locomotive(s) and one or more wagon(s). A freight train including at least one wagon carrying dangerous goods is a dangerous goods train.
All definitions related to rolling stock are defined in the LOC&PAS TSI and the WAG TSI.
CSM on risk assessment: this term is used to designate the Annex I of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 (OJ L 121, 3.5.2013, p. 8).
The following table indicates basic parameters of this TSI and their correspondence to the essential requirements as set out and numbered in Annex III to Directive (EU) 2016/797.
For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 shall apply.
In order to meet the essential requirement ‘Safety’ applying to the Infrastructure and Energy subsystems, the CSM on risk assessment may be applied as an alternative to the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
Accordingly, for the risks identified in point 1.1.4 and the scenarios listed in point 2.2, the risk can be assessed by:
a comparison with a reference system;
an explicit risk estimation and evaluation.
For meeting the essential requirements other than ‘Safety’, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 shall apply.
Element of the infrastructure sub-system | Ref. Clause | Safety | Reliability Availability | Health | Environmental protection | Technical compatibility | Accessibility
Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and technical rooms | 4.2.1.1. | 2.1.1 | | | | |
Fire resistance of tunnel structures | 4.2.1.2. |
1.1.4
2.1.1
Fire reaction of building material | 4.2.1.3. |
1.1.4
2.1.1
1.3.2 | 1.4.2 | |
Fire detection | 4.2.1.4. |
1.1.4
2.1.1
Evacuation facilities | 4.2.1.5. |
1.1.5
2.1.1
Escape walkways | 4.2.1.6. | 2.1.1 | | | | |
Evacuation and rescue points |
4.2.1.7
except (b)
2.1.1 | | | | |
Evacuation and rescue points | 4.2.1.7 (b) | | | | | 1.5 |
Emergency communication | 4.2.1.8. | 2.1.1 | | | | |
Electricity supply for emergency response services | 4.2.1.9 | 2.1.1 | | | | |
Reliability of electrical systems | 4.2.1.10 | 2.1.1 | | | | |
Sectioning of contact line | 4.2.2.1. | 2.2.1 | | | | |
Earthing of contact line | 4.2.2.2. | 2.2.1 | | | | |
For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of section 4.2.3 shall apply.
Element of the rolling stock sub-system | Ref. Clause | Safety | Reliability Availability | Health | Environmental protection | Technical compatibility | Accessibility
Measures to prevent fire | 4.2.3.1 |
1.1.4
2.4.1
1.3.2 | 1.4.2 | |
Measures to detect and control fire | 4.2.3.2 |
1.1.4
2.4.1
Requirements related to emergencies | 4.2.3.3 | 2.4.1 | 2.4.2 | | |
1.5
2.4.3
Requirements related to evacuation | 4.2.3.4 | 2.4.1 | | | | |
The Union rail system, to which Directive (EU) 2016/797 applies and of which the subsystems are parts, has been developed to become an integrated system for which the consistency must be verified.
This consistency has been checked in relation to the development of the specifications within this TSI, its interfaces with respect to the systems in which it is integrated and also the operating rules for the railway.
Taking account of all the applicable essential requirements, the basic parameters related to safety in railway tunnels are set out for the subsystems infrastructure, energy and rolling stock in section 4.2 of this TSI. The operational requirements and responsibilities are set out in the OPE TSI and in section 4.4 of this TSI.
In the light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the functional and technical specifications of those aspects specific to tunnel safety in the above-mentioned subsystems are as follows:
This specification applies to all tunnels.
Unauthorised access to technical rooms shall be prevented.
Where emergency exits are locked for security purposes, it shall always be possible to open them from inside.
This specification applies to all tunnels.
In the event of fire, the integrity of the tunnel lining shall be maintained for a period of time that is sufficiently long to permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services. That period of time shall be in accordance with the evacuation scenarios considered and reported in the emergency plan.
In the cases of immersed tunnels and tunnels which can cause the collapse of important neighbouring structures, the main structure of the tunnel shall withstand the temperature of the fire for a period of time that is sufficient to allow evacuation of the endangered tunnel zones and neighbouring structures. This period of time shall be reported in the emergency plan.
This specification applies to all tunnels.
This specification applies to construction products and building elements inside tunnels. These products shall fulfil the requirements of Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/364 [Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/364 of 1 July 2015 on the classification of the reaction to fire performance of construction products pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 68, 15.3.2016, p. 4).]:
Tunnel building material shall fulfil the requirements of classification A2.
Non-structural panels and other equipment shall fulfil the requirements of classification B.
Exposed cables shall have the characteristics of low flammability, low fire spread, low toxicity and low smoke density. These requirements are fulfilled when the cables fulfil at least the requirements of classification B2ca, s1a, a1.
If the classification is lower than B2ca, s1a, a1, the class of cables may be determined by the infrastructure manager after a risk assessment, taking into account the characteristics of the tunnel and the intended operational regime. For the avoidance of doubt, different classifications of cable may be used for different installations within the same tunnel provided that the requirements of this point are met.
Materials that would not contribute significantly to a fire load shall be listed. They are allowed to not comply with the above.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.
Fire in technical rooms shall be detected in order to alert the infrastructure manager.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.
A safe area shall allow the evacuation of trains that use the tunnel. It shall have a capacity corresponding to the maximum capacity of the trains planned to be operated on the line where the tunnel is located.
The safe area shall maintain survivable conditions for passengers and staff during the time needed for the complete evacuation from the safe area to a final place of safety.
In case of underground/undersea safe areas, the provisions shall allow people to move from the safe area to the surface without having to re-enter the affected tunnel tube.
The lay-out of an underground safe area and its equipment shall take into account the control of smoke, in particular to protect people who use the self-evacuation facilities.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.
Safe areas shall be accessible for people who commence self-evacuation from the train as well as for the emergency response services.
One of the following solutions shall be selected for access points from a train to the safe area:
Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface. These exits shall be provided at least every 1000 m.
Cross-passages between adjacent independent tunnel tubes, which enable the adjacent tunnel tube to be employed as a safe area. Cross-passages shall be provided at least every 500 m.
Alternative technical solutions providing a safe area with a minimum equivalent safety level are permitted. The equivalent level of safety for passengers and staff shall be demonstrated using the Common Safety Method on risk assessment.
Doors giving access from the escape walkway to the safe area shall have a minimum clear opening of 1,4 m wide and 2,0 m high. Alternatively it is permitted to use multiple doors next to each other which are less wide as long as the flow capacity of people is demonstrated to be equivalent or higher.
After passing the doors, the clear width shall continue to be at least 1,5 m wide and 2,25 m high.
The way in which the emergency response services access the safe area shall be described in the emergency plan.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.
Communication shall be possible, either by mobile phone or by fixed connection from underground safe areas to the control centre of the Infrastructure Manager.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 0,5 km in length.
Emergency lighting shall be provided to guide passengers and staff to a safe area in the event of an emergency.
Illumination shall comply with the following requirements:
Single-track tube: on the side of the walkway
Multiple-track tube: on both sides of the tube
Position of lights:
above the walkway, as low as possible, so as not to interfere with the free space for the passage of persons, or
built into the handrails.
The maintained illuminance shall be at least 1 lux at a horizontal plane at walkway level.
Autonomy and reliability: an alternative electricity supply shall be available for an appropriate period of time after failure of the main supply. The time required shall be consistent with the evacuation scenarios and reported in the Emergency Plan.
If the emergency light is switched off under normal operating conditions, it shall be possible to switch it on by both of the following means:
manually from inside the tunnel at intervals of 250 m
by the tunnel operator using remote control
This specification applies to all tunnels.
The escape signage indicates the emergency exits, the distance and the direction to a safe area.
All signs shall be designed according to the requirements of Directive 92/58/EEC of 24 June 1992 concerning the provision of health and/or safety signs at work and to the specification referenced in appendix A, index 1.
Escape signs shall be installed on sidewalls along escape walkways.
The maximum distance between escape signs shall be 50 m.
Signs shall be provided in the tunnel to indicate the position of emergency equipment, where such equipment is present.
All doors leading to emergency exits or cross-passages shall be marked.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 0,5 km in length.
Walkways shall be constructed in a single track tunnel tube on at least one side of the track and in a multiple track tunnel tube on both sides of the tunnel tube. In tunnel tubes with more than two tracks, access to a walkway shall be possible from each track.
The width of the walkway shall be at least 0.8 m.
The minimum vertical clearance above the walkway shall be 2.25 m.
The height of the walkway shall be at bottom-of-rail level or higher.
Local constrictions caused by obstacles in the escape area shall be avoided. The presence of obstacles shall not reduce the minimum width to less than 0,7 m, and the length of the obstacle shall not exceed 2 m.
Continuous handrails shall be installed between 0.8 m and 1.1 m above the walkway providing a route to a safe area.
Handrails shall be placed outside the required minimum clearance of the walkway.
Handrails shall be angled at 30° to 40° to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel at the entrance to and exit from an obstacle.
This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.
For the purpose of this clause, two or more consecutive tunnels will be considered as a single tunnel unless both of the following conditions are met:
The separation between tunnels in open air is longer than the maximum length of the passenger train intended to be operated on the line + 100 m and
The open air area and track situation around the separation between tunnels allow passengers to move away from the train along a a safe space. The open air area shall contain all passengers of the maximum capacity of the train intended to be operated on the line.
Evacuation and rescue points shall be created
Outside both portals of every tunnel of > 1 km and