On the grounds of prudence, the Eurosystem may take any of the following measures:
suspend, limit or exclude a counterparty's access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations, pursuant to any contractual or regulatory arrangements applied by its home NCB or by the ECB;
reject, limit the use of or apply supplementary haircuts to assets mobilised as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations by a specific counterparty on the basis of any information the Eurosystem considers relevant, in particular if the credit quality of the counterparty appears to exhibit a high correlation with the credit quality of the assets mobilised as collateral.
Counterparties that are subject to supervision as referred to in Article 55, point (b)(i), but which do not meet the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, on an individual and/or consolidated basis, in accordance with the supervisory requirements, and counterparties that are subject to supervision of a comparable standard as referred to in Article 55, point (b)(iii), but which do not meet requirements comparable to the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, on an individual and/or consolidated basis, shall automatically have their access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations limited on the grounds of prudence. The limitation shall correspond to the level of access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations prevailing at the time such non-compliance is notified to the Eurosystem. This limitation is without prejudice to any further discretionary measure that the Eurosystem may take. Counterparties shall automatically be suspended from accessing Eurosystem monetary policy operations on the grounds of prudence, unless the ECB’s Governing Council decides otherwise upon the relevant NCB’s request, where any of the following applies:
(-a) there is no prospect of a timely restoration of compliance by the counterparty with the relevant own funds requirements;
compliance with own funds requirements has not been restored through adequate and timely measures at the latest within 20 weeks from the reference date of the data collection exercise in which the non-compliance was identified;
non-compliance was identified outside the scope of the data collection exercise and compliance with own funds requirements has not been restored within eight weeks from the day on which the relevant supervisory authority confirmed that the counterparty no longer complies with minimum own funds requirements and no later than 20 weeks after the end of the relevant quarter.
In the context of its assessment of financial soundness of a counterparty pursuant to Article 55(c) and without prejudice to any other discretionary measures, the Eurosystem may limit, on the grounds of prudence, access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations by the following counterparties:
counterparties for which information on capital and/or leverage ratios under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is incomplete or not made available to the relevant NCB and the ECB in a timely manner and at the latest within 14 weeks from the end of the relevant quarter;
counterparties which are not required to report capital and leverage ratios under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 but for which information of a comparable standard as referred to in Article 55(b)(iii) is incomplete or not made available to the relevant NCB and the ECB in a timely manner and at the latest within 14 weeks from the end of the relevant quarter.
Access shall be restored once the relevant information has been made available to the relevant NCB and it has been determined that the counterparty fulfils the criterion of financial soundness pursuant to Article 55(c). If the relevant information has not been made available at the latest within 20 weeks from the end of the relevant quarter, the counterparty’s access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations shall be automatically suspended on the grounds of prudence.
In the case of a delay in providing the relevant information for a specific reference period arising from events outside of the control of the counterparty, the relevant reporting quarter-end deadlines in relation to the specific quarter shall be extended as follows:
by eight weeks for counterparties fulfilling eligibility criteria under Article 55, point (b)(i) or (ii); or
by two weeks for counterparties referred to in Article 55, point (b)(iii).
The Eurosystem may suspend, limit or exclude, on the grounds of prudence, access to monetary policy operations by counterparties that channel Eurosystem liquidity to another entity that belongs to the same banking ‘group’ (as defined in point (26) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and point (11) of Article 2 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19).]) where the entity receiving such liquidity is (i) a non-eligible wind-down entity or (ii) subject to a discretionary measure on the grounds of prudence.
The Eurosystem may suspend, limit, or exclude, on the grounds of prudence, access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations by counterparties that are in breach of the initial capital requirement laid down in Article 93 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the relevant national legislation.
Without prejudice to any other discretionary measures, the Eurosystem shall, on the grounds of prudence, limit access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations by counterparties deemed to be ‘failing or likely to fail’ by the relevant authorities based on the conditions laid down in Article 18(4)(a) to (d) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 or laid down in national legislation implementing Article 32(4)(a) to (d) of Directive 2014/59/EU. The limitation shall correspond to the level of access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations prevailing at the time when such counterparties are deemed to be ‘failing or likely to fail’. The NCBs shall ensure by means of their contractual or regulatory arrangements that the limitation of access is automatic vis-à-vis the relevant counterparty, without necessitating a specific decision, and that the limitation of access is effective on the day following the day on which the relevant authorities deemed the relevant counterparty ‘failing or likely to fail’. This limitation is without prejudice to any further discretionary measures that the Eurosystem may take.
For counterparties referred to in paragraph 4, the Eurosystem shall lift the limitation on access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations with a standard maturity of one week or shorter, including in cases where the indicative calendar for these operations provides for an exceptionally extended maturity. The lifting of the limitation shall take effect on the business day following the adoption of a resolution scheme or a resolution action, provided that all of the following conditions are met:
the resolution authority has informed the Eurosystem about the upcoming resolution no later than 48 hours before the business day on which the limitation to access is expected to be lifted;
the resolution authority has confirmed in writing:
the adoption of the resolution scheme pursuant to Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 or the resolution action pursuant to national legislation implementing Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU;
that the resolution scheme or resolution action has entered into force, where applicable pursuant to Article 18(7) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014;
the resolution scheme or the resolution action does not provide for the implementation of the bridge institution tool pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 or national legislation implementing Article 40 of Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the limited counterparty;
the competent authority has confirmed in writing that, following the adoption of the resolution scheme or the resolution action, the counterparty referred to in paragraph 4 complies with the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on an individual and/or consolidated basis, taking into consideration adoption and entry into force of the resolution scheme or the resolution action.
In the case of a delay by the competent or resolution authority in fulfilling the conditions referred to in points (a) to (d), the lifting of the limitation may take effect with a corresponding delay.
The Eurosystem may lift the limitation in full where the competent authority provides the information referred to in Article 55a(1) and provided that the counterparty is financially sound pursuant to Article 55, point (c).
Where the information referred to in Article 55a(1) is not provided by the competent authority within 12 weeks after the adoption of the resolution scheme or resolution action, the Eurosystem shall limit the counterparty’s access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations on the grounds of prudence.
Without prejudice to the application of risk control measures pursuant to Article 128(2), the Eurosystem may apply any of the risk mitigation measures set out in Article 2, point (80a), with respect to a counterparty referred to in paragraph 4 following the lifting of the limitation referred to in paragraph 4a.
In addition to limiting access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations under paragraph 4, the Eurosystem may, on the grounds of prudence, suspend, further limit or exclude counterparties from accessing Eurosystem monetary policy operations if they are deemed to be ‘failing or likely to fail’ under paragraph 4 and they meet any of the following:
are not made subject to a resolution action by the resolution authority because there are reasonable prospects that an alternative private sector measure or supervisory action, as referred to in Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and national legislation implementing Article 32(1)(b) of Directive 2014/59/EU, would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, in view of the development of the alternative private sector measure or supervisory action;
are assessed as meeting the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 or national legislation implementing Article 32(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, in view of the development of the resolution action;
result from a resolution action as defined under Article 3(10) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and national legislation implementing Article 2(40) of Directive 2014/59/EU or from an alternative private sector measure or supervisory action as referred to in Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and national legislation implementing Article 32(1)(b) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
Beyond a limitation of access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations pursuant to paragraph 4, the Eurosystem shall suspend, further limit or exclude from access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations on the grounds of prudence counterparties which have been deemed to be ‘failing or likely to fail’ but for which neither a resolution action has been provided for, nor are there reasonable prospects that an alternative private sector measure or supervisory action would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable time-frame as referred to in Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and national legislation implementing Article 32(1)(b) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
In the event that a discretionary measure is based on prudential information, the Eurosystem shall use any such information, provided either by supervisors or by counterparties, in a manner strictly commensurate with, and necessary for, the performance of the Eurosystem's tasks of conducting monetary policy.
Discretionary measures that the Eurosystem may take on the grounds of prudence referred to in paragraph 1 may be based on any information that raises substantial concerns about the counterparty’s financial soundness.
In the case of an occurrence of an event of default, the Eurosystem may, in line with Article 166, suspend, limit or exclude access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations with regard to counterparties that are in default pursuant to Article 165 as implemented in any contractual or regulatory arrangements applied by the relevant NCB.
The Eurosystem may immediately suspend, rather than limit, the counterparty’s access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations where all of the following apply:
the conditions for a limitation as set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are met;
the counterparty’s outstanding exposure to Eurosystem monetary policy operations at the time of the non-compliance is zero;
the counterparty had zero intraday credit and auto-collateralisation exposure over the last 90 business days preceding the decision to impose the measure.
All discretionary measures of the Eurosystem shall be applied in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner and shall be duly justified by the Eurosystem.