The Decision then explains why tying in this particular case is liable to foreclose competition. The Decision sets out that the tying of WMP to Windows affords Microsoft unmatched ubiquity of its media player on PCs worldwide. The relevant evidence reveals that other distribution means are second best. By tying WMP to Windows, Microsoft can offer content providers and software developers that support the Windows Media technologies the ability to rely on the Windows monopoly to reach almost all PC users worldwide. Evidence shows that supporting several media technologies generates additional costs. As such, WMP’s ubiquitous presence induces content providers and software developers to rely primarily on Windows Media technology. Consumers will in turn prefer to use WMP, since a wider array of complementary software and content will be available for that product. Microsoft’s tying reinforces and distorts these ‘network effects’ to its advantage, thereby seriously undermining the competitive process in the media player market. Evidence shows that WMP usage increases due to tying, while other media players are rated more highly in terms of quality by users. Market data as regards media player usage, format usage, as well as content offered by web sites point to a trend in favour of usage of WMP and the Windows Media formats to the detriment of the main competing media players (and media player technologies). Whilst the Decision highlights this trend in favour of WMP and the Windows Media format, the Decision also emphasises that, on the basis of the case law of the Court, the Commission is, in particular, not required to prove that competition has already been foreclosed or that there is a risk of the elimination of all competition to establish a tying abuse. Otherwise, antitrust scrutiny in certain software markets would come too late as evidence of market impact could only be demonstrated once the market had ‘tipped’.
28 I. SUMMARY OF THE INFRINGEMENT › Tying, Decision_act (EU) 2007/53
In forcesince 24 May 2004