Art. 5 Directive (EU) 2004/25

Protection of minority shareholders, the mandatory bid and the equitable price

In forcesince 21 Apr 2004cited 26×
1.

Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds securities of a company as referred to in Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that company, giving him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such a person is required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their holdings at the equitable price as defined in paragraph 4.

2.

Where control has been acquired following a voluntary bid made in accordance with this Directive to all the holders of securities for all their holdings, the obligation laid down in paragraph 1 to launch a bid shall no longer apply.

3.

The percentage of voting rights which confers control for the purposes of paragraph 1 and the method of its calculation shall be determined by the rules of the Member State in which the company has its registered office.

4.

The highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or by persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period, to be determined by Member States, of not less than six months and not more than 12 before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall be regarded as the equitable price. If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in concert with him/her purchases securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his/her offer so that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.

Provided that the general principles laid down in Article 3(1) are respected, Member States may authorise their supervisory authorities to adjust the price referred to in the first subparagraph in circumstances and in accordance with criteria that are clearly determined. To that end, they may draw up a list of circumstances in which the highest price may be adjusted either upwards or downwards, for example where the highest price was set by agreement between the purchaser and a seller, where the market prices of the securities in question have been manipulated, where market prices in general or certain market prices in particular have been affected by exceptional occurrences, or in order to enable a firm in difficulty to be rescued. They may also determine the criteria to be applied in such cases, for example the average market value over a particular period, the break-up value of the company or other objective valuation criteria generally used in financial analysis.

Any decision by a supervisory authority to adjust the equitable price shall be substantiated and made public.

5.

By way of consideration the offeror may offer securities, cash or a combination of both.

However, where the consideration offered by the offeror does not consist of liquid securities admitted to trading on a regulated market, it shall include a cash alternative.

In any event, the offeror shall offer a cash consideration at least as an alternative where he/she or persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period beginning at the same time as the period determined by the Member State in accordance with paragraph 4 and ending when the offer closes for acceptance, has purchased for cash securities carrying 5 % or more of the voting rights in the offeree company.

Member States may provide that a cash consideration must be offered, at least as an alternative, in all cases.

6.

In addition to the protection provided for in paragraph 1, Member States may provide for further instruments intended to protect the interests of the holders of securities in so far as those instruments do not hinder the normal course of a bid.

The 10 that are cited most themselves, of 26.

  • Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 20 July 2017. Marco Tronchetti Provera SpA and Others v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la BDecisioninterprets

    This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12).

    20 Jul 2017 · 62016CJ0206

  • Directive (EU) 2011/6126Law

    … по отношение на емитенти контролът се определя в съответствие с член 5, параграф 3 от Директива 2004/25/ЕО. 6. Настоящият раздел се …

  • Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 October 2009. Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AGDecision

    As far as Directive 2004/25 is concerned, this introduces, in Article 5, a requirement that a shareholder who has acquired control of a company must launch a mandatory bid. In Article 16 it provides for the right of sell-out.

    15 Oct 2009 · 62008CJ0101

  • BGH, Urteil vom 29. Juli 2014 - II ZR 353/12Decision

    Diese Auslegung, die ebenso für Parallelerwerbe nach § 31 Abs. 4, 6 WpÜG gilt, steht im Einklang mit Art. 5 Abs. 4 Unterabs. 1 der Richtlinie 2004/25/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 21. April 2004 betreffend …

    29 Jul 2014 · KORE301112014

  • Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 10 December 2020. Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited.Decisioninterprets

    This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of, first, Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12) and, second, the …

    10 Dec 2020 · 62019CJ0735

  • Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 9 September 2021. Adler Real Estate AG and Others v Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA).Decision

    In that regard, it must be observed that the provisions of Directive 2004/25 govern the calculation relating to the threshold for a significant holding in a company, held by a natural or legal person, above which that person is required to …

    9 Sep 2021 · 62018CJ0605

  • Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 15 March 2017. Marco Tronchetti Provera SpA and Others v Commissione Nazionale per le Società Decision

    This request for a preliminary ruling turns on the proper interpretation of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC. [Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12), as amended …

    15 Mar 2017 · 62016CC0206

  • Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 12 February 2026. GT and Others v Valora Effekten Handel AG.Decision

    Article 5 of that directive, entitled ‘Protection of minority shareholders, the mandatory bid and the equitable price’, provides, in paragraph 1: ‘Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the …

    12 Feb 2026 · 62024CJ0864

  • Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 10 September 2020. Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited.Decision

    The Latvian Government’s argument at the hearing on this point, that limitation of the compensation can take account of the relative imprecision of the provision of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25 and the broad discretion of the Member …

    10 Sep 2020 · 62019CC0735

  • Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 3 July 2025.Decision

    … the price established according to the common criterion: the judgment in Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) , paragraph 48. 25 Article 5(4), first sentence, of Directive 2004/25. The fair price is not, therefore, necessarily the same as the current …

    3 Jul 2025 · 62024CC0567