Established suppliers, with cabinets in place in a significant number of outlets, are protected from the entry of competitors to outlets in which they are present by this cost barrier: the presence of a number of networks of incumbent supplier-exclusive cabinets, extending to almost all outlets in the relevant market, has the effect of raising the costs of the entry to the relevant market of non-incumbent competitors and expansion therein by all suppliers. Retailers will not be likely to accept cabinets from suppliers not offering terms which are at least equally favourable to those being offered by suppliers with cabinets already present in the outlet, or to those being offered by suppliers in the market generally. In the context of the relevant market, this means that the supplier must be prepared to offer a modern cabinet on 'free on loan` terms (hence entailing no direct charge), and with maintenance assured by that supplier. A new entrant will moreover not normally expect to get the same return from installing a cabinet as an incumbent would, at least not until his position in the market has been well-established. This incumbency advantage has ensured that the only new entrants to the relevant market in recent times have had 'deep pockets`: Mars, Häagen Dazs and Nestlé. The cost of the entry of Mars is illustrated by the investment which it made in cabinets in 1994, as a proportion of its ice-cream turnover in that year(see paragraph 80). This heavy investment in cabinet provision means that an ice-cream supplier's other investment requirements suffer accordingly, particularly during the period following market entry when the supplier has not yet recouped from the retailer the cost of its investment in freezer cabinets.
Recital 191, Decision_act (EU) 1998/531
In forcesince 11 Mar 1998