In response to CFK's claim, Solvay offered maximum compensation for 1988 of 4 Kt instead of the 8,5 Kt. For 1989, it proposed that the guarantee be increased by only 5,3 % instead of 8,3 % by taking account of a 'neutral zone` of 3 %. The guarantee for 1989 would thus be 190 Kt instead of the 194 Kt which CFK had originally demanded.
A meeting was held on 14 March 1989 attended by senior representatives of CFK and its parent company Kali & Salz on the one side and DSW on the other. It is highly significant that no official record or minute was made of this meeting and indeed no trace of it whatever exists at either CFK or Kali & Salz. However a brief handwritten note of this meeting was found at DSW. It is clear that the object was to resolve the one outstanding point, namely whether the compensation was to be made retrospective. There was no dispute about the basic machinery: the Solvay note reads 'Verstaendnis System: i.o.` ('Agreement system: OK`). Solvay, while proposing some changes, was satisfied with the way the scheme was working ('Schiff laufen lassen und nach vorn orientieren.`). It appears from the note that both sides had agreed that for the next eight months Solvay would purchase from CFK at the rate of 1 000 tonnes per month.
The compensatory mechanism was put into practice with Solvay buying in from CFK during the first half of 1989 the additional 8,5 Kt which had been claimed by CFK.
Arguments in defence (8) Both Solvay and CFK deny that any collusive agreement or arrangement was made between them. The incriminating documentary evidence found at DSW is explained by Solvay as referable to a scheme which was conceived on a wholly unilateral basis when it was considering acquiring CFK's business in about 1988. In order to maintain CFK as a going concern pending the negotiations (says Solvay), it calculated (again without any contact with CFK) the tonnage which that undertaking would need to sell on the German market in order to load its plant at a level that would guarantee its survival. (It is not however explained by Solvay why it should follow a policy that would lead it to pay a higher price for CFK's business than would otherwisse be the case, nor, if it were only a matter of ensuring an optimal plant utilization rate for CFK, it should need to refer specifically to its sales on the German market.) This 'survival tonnage` Solvay assessed at 179 Kt for 1986. The frequent references in the documents to a 'claim` or 'demand` by CFK, and the very detailed calculations on this question do not, Solvay asserts, imply any contact with that undertaking any more than do the references to an 'offer` by Solvay or to a 'compromise`. As for the meeting between DSW and CFK and Kali & Salz on 14 March 1989 its purpose was simply to discuss the possible acquisition by Solvay of an interest in CFK's soda activities: only during this meeting did Solvay for the first time give an indication to CFK that it was considering helping that company to survive, but nothing concrete was agreed and nothing ever resulted from the meeting.
Solvay did not consider it necessary to propose that the persons involved be found in order to corroborate its factual arguments, nor did it request an oral hearing.
CFK for its part denied any involvement in collusion: it could give no explanation for the documents discovered at DSW, arguing that they were a matter for Solvay and not itself: there was nothing in its own documentation which could connect it with any collusive scheme.