88 3. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION › 3.2. Dumping › 3.2.2. Normal value › 3.2.2.1. Existence of significant distortions › 3.2.2.1.9. Systemic nature of the distortions described, Regulation (EU) 2023/2180

In forcesince 16 Oct 2023

With regard to the applicant’s second argument, the Commission disagreed. First of all, the applicant’s reference to US – Countervailing Measures (China) is misplaced, as that dispute did not concern the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation – which is the relevant legal basis for the determination of normal value in the present investigation – but the interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In addition, the Commission recalled that the planning system in the Chinese economy goes well beyond the national 14th FYP. Instead, the whole economy is subject to a complex web of FYPs, driving decisions by public authorities at all levels, as laid out already in recital (42). The Commission also considers the FYPs binding documents, as is apparent from the respective sections on implementation within the plans. For example, the national 14th FYP contains a section on ‘improving the planning implementation mechanism’ stating that: ‘[a]s regards the binding indicators, major engineering projects, and tasks in public services, environmental protection, safety, and other fields set out in this Plan, it is necessary to clarify the responsibilities parties and schedule requirements, to allocate public resources, guide and control social resources, and ensure completion as scheduled. As regards the expected indicators and tasks in the fields of industrial development and structural adjustment set out in this Plan, it is necessary to mainly rely on the role of market players to achieve them. Governments at all levels must create a favourable policy environment, institutional environment, and legal environment’. Similarly, the 14th FYP on promoting the modernization of agriculture and rural areas 2021/25 (see recital (59)) sets out in its Section 5 various follow-up implementation mechanisms, linking the implementation of the plan to the authorities’ support for other policies. Moreover, with respect to the CCP’ role, the Commission reiterated its view laid out in recitals (49) and (50). In particular, concerning the Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era, the Commission recalled that Section II.4 of the Guidelines states: ‘[w]e must raise the Party’s overall capacity to lead private-sector United Front work and effectively step up the work in this area’ while Section III.6 contains the following language: ‘[w]e must further step up Party building in private enterprises and enable the Party cells to play their role effectively as a fortress and enable Party members to play their parts as vanguards and pioneers’. In the same vein, the Commission finds it difficult to follow the applicant’s argument that despite overlaps between members of the board and of the CCP organisation, a company would not be under policy guidance and State control, given that the applicant did not seek to otherwise disprove the Commission’s findings, in particular those in recitals (50), and (52) – (54). In view of the above, the Commission rejected this argument.