Foremost, the Commission considers that the calculations provided by the Romanian authorities do not demonstrate the return to viability of CNU as they are based on the wrong premise that CNU satisfactorily contributes to the restructuring of its operations. As explained above, the Commission indeed considers that the revenues from the supply monopoly for the provision of UO2 to SNN are not free of aid (see recital 125). It follows that there is no return to long-term viability without further State aid since the supplies to SNN under the monopoly are not limited in time and are expected to constitute the bulk of the revenue of CNU during the restructuring period. In practice, as shown in Table 5, notwithstanding the shortcomings in Romania’s third restructuring plan, absent this source of revenue, CNU would generate at most a ROE of 2,2 % and ROCE of 0,9 % in 2023. This 2,2 % return is far below the current 5,0 % market rate for a Romanian sovereign bond with a 10-year maturity; this 2,2 % return is also far below the 7,5-8,5 % ROCE which Romania deems to be an adequate remuneration for capital in this industry, by reference to the Paks II decision (see recital 65). The ROCE benchmark that Romania puts forward relates to the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant, which entails risks, costs and remunerations that are different from those of nuclear fuel supply. CNU’s business involves a mining component exposed to the evolution of yellow cake prices and a conversion activity into uranium dioxide. A minimum target ROCE for CNU around 7 % to 8,4 %, which coincidentally happens to be in the same order of magnitude as the range in Romania’s submission, might therefore be appropriate for reference [In 2018, Orano’s post-tax weighted cost of capital on uranium mining was 7,65 % to 11,6 % and 6,7 % in subsequent refining and processing activities. The relative weights of mining and refining and processing cost for CNU in 2019 are 34 % and 66 %, respectively (see table 5), which results in an ‘all in’ post-tax weighted cost of capital of 7 % to 8,4 %, if the capital cost of Orano was set as target ROCE for CNU. This would be conservative. The minimum target ROCE should be higher than a post-tax weighted cost of capital since an acceptable remuneration must always cover the borrowing costs and appropriate shareholder remuneration. Consolidated accounts of Orano 31.12.2018, p. 46 available at: https://www.orano.group/docs/default-source/orano-doc/finance/publications-financieres-et-reglementees/2018/resultats-annuels-2018/orano_comptes]. In any event, CNU’s projected ROE and ROCE at the end of the restructuring period in 2023 remain largely below the 5 % borrowing costs of Romania if the non-aid free revenues are not taken into consideration. CNU cannot thus be held to return to long-term viability without further aid.
139 4. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID › 4.3. Compatibility of the aid and the legal basis for the assessment › 4.3.3. Restructuring plan and return to long-term viability › 4.3.3.2. Doubts on the return to long-term viability, Decision_act (EU) 2020/1012
In forcesince 24 Feb 2020