Both offers were examined. The Brazilian exporter’s offer eliminates the injurious effects of dumping and limits to a sufficient degree the risk of circumvention. With regard to the Armenian exporter’s offer, given the complex structure of the company group and its complex sales channels, a high risk of cross-compensation exists with sales of the same product to the same customers but from different origins as well as sales of different products to the same customers from different sales companies in the same group. The Armenian exporter submitted a substantially revised undertaking offer after the deadline set out in Article 8(2) of the basic Regulation. It is noted that in addition to the fact that the revised offer was submitted after the deadline, it cannot be accepted for the following reason: although the company offered to sell only directly to the first independent customer in the EU, i.e. without including its two related companies in the sales channel, the investigation showed that the company sold other products to the same customers in the EU. Moreover, the company announced that it planned to produce and sell a new product type, namely ACF, to the EU. As it is possible that this new product type could be sold to the same customers in the EU, even the revised offer cannot limit the risk of cross-compensation to an acceptable degree.
114 8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES › 8.4. Form of the measures, Council Regulation (EC) No 925/2009 of 24 September 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dump…
In forcesince 24 Sep 2009cited 1×
Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 25 January 2017. Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council of the European Union.Decision
Recitals 113 to 115 of the contested regulation are worded as follows: In the course of the investigation, the sole cooperating exporting producer in Armenia and the sole cooperating exporting producer in Brazil offered price undertakings …
25 Jan 2017 · 62009TJ0512(01)