Art. 7 Special report No 7/93 concerning controls of irregularities and fraud in the agricultur…

In forcesince 9 Dec 1993

Notifications to the Commission

3.12. As stated in paragraph 2.23 above, under Article 7.2 Member States have to send to the Commission annually a copy of the lists which they send to each other of undertakings established in a Member State other than that in which the payment is made or received. With one exception, the notifications copied to the Commission under this article have been filed without action. In the one exception which resulted in a request by the Commission to Germany to include the payments in its annual programme for 1991, there was no follow up action by the Commission and the Court found that the amounts concerned were not even scrutinized in Germany. As the objective of Article 7 is to ensure that the amounts notified are considered for scrutiny, both the Commission and Member States should use communicated information for this purpose.

3.13. Article 7 on its own is not adequate for the control of traders whose commercial records or whose suppliers' or customers' commercial records are maintained, in part or wholly, in a Member State other than that in which the payment was made or received. This shortcoming needs to be rectified. (See also paragraphs 2.24, 2.48 and 2.55).

4.

THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ON FRAUDS AND IRREGULARITIES AND THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD

Introduction

4.1. Chapters 1 to 3 of this report have dealt with the one of the Community's main instruments in the detection of fraud and irregularities against the EAGGF. This chapter deals with the communication of frauds and irregularities after discovery and the role of the Commission in coordinating the fight against fraud. The audit started in January 1991 and finished in February 1992.

Notification and Recovery under Regulation (EEC) No 595/91

4.2. In its Annual and several Special Reports the Court has criticized the ineffectiveness of the actions taken by the Commission and the Member States to combat fraud and irregularities, mainly in relation to Own Resources and to the EAGGF. In early 1991, the Court started a comprehensive enquiry with the aim of assessing some of the Community's defences against fraud and irregularities which could affect the Guarantee Sector of the EAGGF. For this purpose the Court visited the Commission and 6 Member States: the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Italy, Greece and Luxembourg. The remaining countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland) were also included in the audit by using questionnaires, but they were not visited.

4.3. In order to monitor not only the cases detected but also the follow up actions by the Member States, including prosecution, sanctions, recovery of sums unduly paid, an information system between the Member States and the Commission was created by Council Regulation (EEC) No 283/72(15) (). This was subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91(16) (). Its chief objective is to ensure that the Member States and the Commission are fully informed of irregular practices so that they can be tracked down and prevented more effectively(17) ().

4.4. Under Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91(18) () Member States are required to notify:

(a)the Commission of the application of the national provisions to implement the Regulation including a list and description of the roles of the authorities and bodies responsible for doing so (Article 2);

(b)the Commission once a quarter of any irregularities, the proceedings instituted and subsequent significant developments (Articles 3 and 5);

(c)the other Member States concerned and the Commission of any irregularities discovered or that are suspected which it is feared may have effects outside the reporting Member State's territory (Article 4);

4.5. The Commission is required to:

(a)assess the Member States' notification system (Article 2).

(b)inform the Member States concerned where it considers that irregularities have taken place and to request them to hold an enquiry (Article 6);

(c)maintain appropriate contact with Member States to supplement the information received and to organize information meetings for the Member States (Article 8);

(d)put before the EAGGF Committee(19) () cases where the nature of the irregularity is such as to suggest that identical or similar practices could occur in other Member States (Article 8);

(e)provide the EAGGF Committee with overall summary information every quarter (Article 9);

(f)include in the annual EAGGF Report the number of cases notified, those closed and sums recovered and written off (Article 9).

4.6. Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 also contains provisions concerning:

(a)the Community financing of part of the costs of the inquiries, legal proceedings and recovery of sums unduly paid (Article 7);

(b)the Commission officials' rights and constraints when participating in national inquiries (Article 6);

(c)the upgrading of the quality of the information to be provided to the Commission (Article 8) and

(d)the confidentiality of the information (Article 10).

Coordination of the Fight against Fraud

4.7. In response to demands from Parliament, the Council and the Court, an anti-fraud coordinating unit, UCLAF, was created by the Commission in 1988 to coordinate the Commission's resources and activities for combatting fraud and irregularities. The unit, within the Secretariat General of the Commission, was placed under the direct responsibility of the President.

4.8. The European Council of Madrid in June 1989 adopted a workplan for the anti-fraud campaign, to be managed by UCLAF. This plan did not include target dates for the implementation of the actions. It remained in force until the Commission in its 1992 Report and Action Programme for 1993 on the fight against fraud has set out a more detailed statement of its mission(20) (). Because it is, as yet, too soon to assess its impact, that Action Programme was not examined in the context of this audit. However, the role of UCLAF in relation to the EAGGF is further discussed in paragraphs 4.20 and 4.23.

The notification system

General

4.9. Neither Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 nor any other Community instrument defines the concept of fraud or irregularity. In an attempt to define 'irregularity' and 'primary administrative or judicial finding of fact' and to lay down some basic rules concerning the notification of attempted fraud, a working document was prepared by the Commission and communicated to the Member States in 1989(21) (). In this document 'irregularity' is defined as 'any infringement of a Community or national rule as a result of an act or omission by an economic operator, whether deliberate or not...'. 'Primary administrative or judicial finding of fact' should be understood as meaning 'the first report (even internal) by an administrative or judicial body concluding that an irregularity exists, irrespective of whether that conclusion must subsequently be revised or withdrawn in the light of developments in the administrative or judicial proceedings'. However, these definitions have no legal standing. Agreed definitions should be included in a revision of the Regulation.

4.10. Financial irregularities and frauds involve breaches of the law and result in losses to the Community budget which perpetrators are under an obligation to refund. They should not be confused, however, with exploitation of loopholes in the law which result in material advantages to their perpetrators not intended by the legislator. Nonetheless, Member States should accept an obligation to report to the Commission the existence of exploitable weaknesses in Community legislation so that the Commission can initiate action to revise the law and thus relieve the budget in future of the cost of conferring unwarranted rewards on unintended beneficiaries.

Role of the Communicating units in Member States

4.11. Article 2 obliges the Member States to communicate to the Commission 'the list of authorities and bodies responsible... (for notifications)... and the main provisions relating to the role and fuctioning of those authorities and bodies and to the procedures which they are reponsible for applying'. In the majority of the Member States visited the responsible units receive summaries from the paying agencies or Customs authorities and pass them on to the Commission. Except in the United Kingdom and Portugal these services rarely compile statistics on frauds and irregularities. They have no central follow up procedures nor do they conduct any comparative analyses of frauds and irregularities detected for the purpose of targeting enquiries and setting priorities for the future.

4.12. As indicated in the earlier part of this report, in each Member State there are several different services involved with the control of the EAGGF expenditure. Coordination at national and regional level is clearly essential.

Reliability of information

4.13. The period of two months after each quarter within which the Commission must be notified (Articles 3 and 5) has not been consistently respected for the notification of cases (Article 3) by the United Kingdom, Greece and Italy.

4.14. Belgium sends its communications irregularly. Two of the six cases notified by Belgium in 1989 were mistakenly reported as relating to EAGGF expenditure whereas in fact they related to Own Resources income. Portugal and Belgium sent the communications for only one quarter in 1990.

4.15. Although Greece joined the Communities in 1981 it did not send any notifications until 1989. In addition, because of the deficiencies in the notification procedures in Greece, the Court's auditors were unable to determine whether all irregularities and frauds were correctly communicated to the Commission.

4.16. Italy sends few notifications on the follow up of cases. The length of time it takes in Italy to complete the due legal process hampers prompt notification.

4.17. Notifications are not always made promptly even within Member States. One of the reasons given by Member States is the need to maintain confidentiality. In one case in Italy the paying agency had continued to make payments after facts were detected which gave rise to suspicions of fraud. Notwithstanding the need to maintain secrecy in such cases so as not to jeopardize investigations or legal procedures, at least the paying agency should have been alerted in order to prevent further payments being made pending completion of enquiries.

4.18. The information contained in the communications is frequently incomplete and vague. They do not always include all the data required such as financial and recovery information.

4.19. In respect of Article 5 notifications by Member States of subsequent action, the Commission reported in 1990(22) (), that in 161 cases it had been more than ten years since the last communication had been received. In 684 cases, it had been more than two years since the last communication had been received. In most instances the cases were already closed, but the outcome had not been communicated to the Commission nor had the Commission taken action to find out what had happened.

4.20. The Commission should have a mechanism for reminding the Member States wherever Article 5 communications are in arrears. Furthermore, all cases of undue delay should be systematically reported to the EAGGF Committee.

4.21. The information on EAGGF is sent by the Member States to the Commission's Agricultural Directorate-General (DG VI). This Directorate-General passes the information to UCLAF on a selective basis. UCLAF does not receive any information on EAGGF matters directly from Member States. The Court noted that cooperation between the two units had not been good as a consequence of which UCLAF was hindered in fulfilling its role of managing and coordinating the information passed to it.

4.22. Information on frauds and irregularities is recorded by the Commission in a computerized database (called COMA35) which should serve as the basis for the follow up of irregularities. It should also facilitate analyses and be used to highlight particular problems by market or by Member State for further investigation.

4.23. Substantial delays occurred in the Commission's entering of information in COMA35. Therefore, the information base was incomplete at the time of the audit. For example, information communicated by Greece in the second, third and fourth quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 was not recorded in COMA35 until the end of 1991.

4.24. On the basis of the information in the preceeding paragraphs the Court concludes that the Commission's data base is not reliable for producing statistics and is of limited use to the Commission to monitor and follow up irregularities in the Member States. The Commission has never assessed the operation of the notification system by Member States.

4.25. To assist in the detection of frauds and irregularities affecting the Community budget, the Commission has developed a system, called IRENE 3, in which COMA35 will be integrated. It is a database managed by UCLAF which should eventually contain information on all frauds and irregularities communicated by Member States to the Commission. When the system is fully operational the information entered on the COMA35 data base will automatically update IRENE 3 files. By the end of 1992 IRENE 3 was not yet operational despite an original deadline of mid-1991. Although UCLAF is the responsible data base manager, it will not, however, have the supporting information to check the accuracy and the reliability of the data; that information will remain with DG VI.

Recoveries

4.26. In the period 1972-1991, Member States reported 5775 cases of fraud and irregularity involving a total amount of 725,5 Mio ECU(23) (). As some Member State communications did not include the amounts involved, this figure is probably an understatement. Table 4 gives a summary by Member State.

Table 4 - Cases of Irregularities and Frauds reported 1972-1991 ">1Member States(1)"> ID="1">91> ID="2">17,613> ID="3">1,251> ID="4">7,1> ID="5">0,008> ID="6">0> ID="7">16,353> ID="8">92,9"> ID="1">373> ID="2">18,645> ID="3">6,359> ID="4">34,1> ID="5">0,587> ID="6">3,1> ID="7">11,699> ID="8">62,8"> ID="1">1 653> ID="2">146,060> ID="3">26,685> ID="4">18,3> ID="5">2,100> ID="6">1,4> ID="7">117,274> ID="8">80,3"> ID="1">30> ID="2">0,816> ID="3">0,034> ID="4">4,2> ID="5">0> ID="6">0> ID="7">0,782> ID="8">95,8"> ID="1">137> ID="2">3,578> ID="3">0,488> ID="4">13,6> ID="5">0> ID="6">0> ID="7">3,090> ID="8">86,4"> ID="1">751> ID="2">26,885> ID="3">14,835> ID="4">55,2> ID="5">0,698> ID="6">2,6> ID="7">11,351> ID="8">42,2"> ID="1">121> ID="2">8,055> ID="3">2,238> ID="4">27,8> ID="5">1,102> ID="6">13,7> ID="7">4,714> ID="8">58,5"> ID="1">783> ID="2">452,605> ID="3">11,470> ID="4">2,5> ID="5">0,621> ID="6">0,1> ID="7">440,514> ID="8">97,4"> ID="1">1> ID="2">0,0> ID="3">-> ID="4">-> ID="5">0> ID="6">0> ID="7">0,0> ID="8">0"> ID="1">554> ID="2">27,681> ID="3">7,646> ID="4">27,6> ID="5">0,034> ID="6">0,1> ID="7">20,000> ID="8">72,3"> ID="1">66> ID="2">1,274> ID="3">0,641> ID="4">50,3> ID="5">0> ID="6">0> ID="7">0,632> ID="8">49,7"> ID="1">1 215> ID="2">22,270> ID="3">6,038> ID="4">27,1> ID="5">3,149> ID="6">14,1> ID="7">13,082> ID="8">58,8"> ID="1">5 775> ID="2">725,482> ID="3">77,685> ID="4">10,7> ID="5">8,299> ID="6">1,1> ID="7">639,491> ID="8">88,2""Source: Commission's data base (COMA 35) as at 16 March 1992 and Court of Auditors' analysis.

>

4.27. At the time of the audit only the figures up to 1991 were available. According to notifications of subsequent action, the amount recovered was 77,7 Mio ECU, just 10,7 % of that communicated. The outstanding amount to be recovered was 639,5 Mio ECU, 88,2 % of the value of cases reported. This consisted of recoverable cases and also cases where the recoverability was under discussion between the Commission and Member States. The amount considered irrecoverable was 8,3 Mio ECU, 1,1 % of reported cases. In principle, the financial consequences of sums which cannot be recovered have to be borne by the Community unless non recovery is due to a Member State's negligence. However, in a large number of cases dating back over 20 years, the Commission and Member States have not reached agreement on liability. Of the 109 cases deemed as irrecoverable by Member States, the Commission had accepted responsibility for 67; Member States had accepted 7 and the remainder were under consideration at 30.1.1991. The situation was unchanged at the beginning of 1992.

4.28. The acceptance by the Commission that a Member State is blameless for non recovery implies that an amount, which should have been recovered, is written off anticipated Community revenue. By virtue of Article 29 of the Financial Regulation this requires the intervention of the financial controller. In practice the financial controller's intervention consists of an informal personal contact with the authorizing officer on the basis of which the acceptance of financial responsibility by the Commission is approved. This procedure does not include an official communication, or an official stamp. The financial controller does not keep records of the number of approved cases accepted by the Commission, which is not an acceptable practice.

4.29. As indicated in paragraph 4.20 the Commission's recovery statistics do not necessarily reflect reality. The Commission has therefore failed to adequately establish the true amounts not yet recovered and has failed to institute a procedure to satisfy itself that the amounts notified for recovery are recovered within a reasonable period.

Prosecution and sanctions

4.30. Member States are responsible for the detection, and investigation of fraud and irregularities and for the application of legal and other sanctions provided for under national legislation. However, sanctions are not applied in a homogeneous way in the Community. Indeed there is no national code of administrative sanctions in the United Kingdom, Ireland and France in the context of EAGGF Guarantee schemes. These apply administrative sanctions only in rare cases if Community legislation specifically provides them. In the case of improperly paid amounts there is no homogeneous policy to charge interest on outstanding amounts. A contributory factor is that there is no legal definition of 'fraud' or 'irregularity' common to all Member States. The problem was commented upon in the Courts 1986 Annual Report(24) (). The Commission is also of the view that the autonomy of national law can mean that the same infringement is punished with varying degrees of severity(25) ().

4.31. The Commission has already acknowledged that Community legislation itself must lay down administrative penalties sufficiently severe to outweigh any economic advantage to be derived from an infringment, thus achieving both a preventive and a dissuasive effect(26) (). The Commission and the Council should endeavour to put into place the appropriate legislation as a matter of urgency.

4.32. The Member States and the Commission should give maximum priority to the introduction of interest charges and administrative sanctions in respect of frauds and irregularities against the EAGGF and to the establishment of common criteria for the application of comparable penalties.

Cooperation between Member States

4.33. Neither the Commission nor any Member State visited, used a system for monitoring communications between Member States as laid down in article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 595/91. Accordingly no information was readily available regarding them.

5.

CONCLUSION

5.1. The Commission's coordinating action, its dissemination of good practice and its monitoring of the Member States' systems were found to be inadequate. The shortcomings and disparities in risk analysis, information, audit scope, coordination and follow up which the Court found to exist in Member States are now being addressed. The Commission's reply to this Special Report describes a number of initiatives which are welcomed by the Court.

5.2. In view of the incompleteness of the data notified by the Member States, the lack of follow up by the Commission of amounts to be recovered and the insufficient use of the data notified, Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 had at the time of the audit, been of little significance as an instrument in the fight against fraud.

5.3. In respect of the coordination of the fight against fraud in the EAGGF area, the Court found that the division of responsibilities between UCLAF and other Commission anti fraud services was unclear and its informatic tool IRENE 3 was not yet operational.

5.4. The Commission has addressed certain deficiencies in the role and effectiveness of UCLAF in relation to the EAGGF and in particular in relation to the implementation of the Regulations mentioned in this report. The Commission should continue to give priority to concrete action in terms of detection, investigation, analysis and follow up of frauds.

5.5. Having regard to the significance of multi-national enterprises in the marketing of agricultural products, the Commission and Member States need to give more attention to the scrutiny and follow up of transnational transactions involving other Member States or third countries.

5.6. Steps should be taken to ensure that, as a condition of receiving payments, beneficiaries must allow full access, for audit purposes, to all relevant commercial records, including production and quality control records wherever they may be located.

5.7. With a view to strengthening the means of combatting irregularities and fraud in the EAGGF area, the Commission and Council should, as a matter of urgency, take the steps necessary to put in place a system of Community administrative penalties.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 9 December 1993.

For the Court of Auditors André J. MIDDELHOEK President

(1)() Council Regulation (EEC) No 4045/89 of 21 December 1989 (OJ L 388 of 30.12.1989).

(2)() Council Directive 77/435/EEC of 27 June 1977 (OJ L 172 of 12.7.1977).

(3)() Article 3

1.The accuracy of primary data under scrutiny shall be verified in appropriate cases by an adequate number of cross-checks, including, inter alia:

–

comparisons with the commercial documents of suppliers, customers, carriers and other third parties directly or indirectly connected with transactions carried out within the financing system by the EAGGF Guarantee section,

–

physical checks upon the quantity and nature of stocks, and

–

comparison with the records of financial flows leading to or consequent upon the transactions carried out within the financing system by the EAGGF Guarantee section.

2.In particular, where undertakings are required to keep particular book records of stock in accordance with Community or national provisions, scrutiny of these records shall, in appropriate cases include a comparison with the commercial documents and, where appropriate, with the actual quantities in stock.

(4)() Annual Report on the 1987 Financial Year (OJ C 316 of 12.12.1988).

(5)() Special Report No 2/90, OJ C 133 of 31.5.1990.

(6)() Special Report No 2/92, OJ C 101 of 22.4.1992.

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